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IV 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Several acronyms are utilized in this brief. These acronyms are set forth at the end of the 
Table of Cases and Authorities. 
This appeal presents a request for a determination of the constitutionality and legality of a 
JPA and an MOU entered into between the City and IHD. The City filed a request for an 
iajunction and declaratory relief seeking a declaration from the trial court that the JPA and MOU 
were valid and enforceable. R. pp. 19-47. The agreements followed extended litigation between 
the parties and were contemplated during execution by the governing bodies to resolve litigation 
between the entities regarding jurisdiction, operation, and maintenance of streets located within 
the City's boundaries. Id. 
The 2003 JP A by its terms purported to be perpetual and required IHD to pay to the City 
all IHD ad valorem taxes collected from properties within City boundaries. R. pp. 37-42. A 
related Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") was executed September 14, 2005, 
surrendering IHD's jurisdiction of highway districts streets within City boundaries to the City. 
R. pp. 43-44. IHD repeatedly attempted to renegotiate the JPA with the City. R. p. 233. The 
City declined negotiation and sued seeking a declaration of the parties' rights under the JPA and 
MOU after IHD notified the City it would no longer voluntarily pay over tax revenues under the 
JPA because IHD's Board believed the JPA was illegal. R. pp. 45-47. 
1 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
The City filed its Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief on August 16, 2013. 
R. p. 19. IHD moved to dismiss the City's Complaint on September 9, 2013, asserting that the 
JP A was void and unenforceable. R. pp. 49-51; 56-72. IHD contended that an agreement 
entered into by an Idaho political subdivision which created a multi-year indebtedness or liability 
violated A1i. VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Joint Powers Act. R. pp. 56-72. 
On December 9, 2013, the district court issued its memorandum opinion which denied 
the motion to dismiss. R. pp. 154-17 5. The district court concluded that the JP A created a multi-
year liability, but the liability was lawful. R. p. 163. The district court declined to decide if the 
JP A violated public policy, noting it presented a question of fact. R. p. 169. 
Following the decision, the parties stipulated to a reciprocal preliminary injunction which 
allowed IHD to make payments to the City of ad valorem taxes without such payments being 
deemed voluntary payments. R. pp. 176-178. Based upon the stipulation, the district court 
entered a Reciprocal Preliminary Injunction Order on December 16, 2013. R. pp. 179-181. The 
district court granted a Rule 12 permissive appeal which this Court declined. R. pp. 194-195; 
272. 
The City moved for summary judgment which was scheduled for hearing on July 22, 
2014. R. pp. 187-193. The court granted the City's summary judgment motion by decision 
dated July 31, 2014. R. pp. 273-290. The trial court incorporated by reference into the SJ 
Decision it's analysis from the memorandum denying the motion to dismiss. R. p. 278. The 
district court entered an order granting declaratory relief on July 31, 2014. R. pp. 291-295. 
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On July 31, 2014, the district court entered the City's proposed judgment. R. pp. 291-
295. On August 13, 2015, the City filed its memorandum of costs and supporting affidavit 
seeking costs and attorney fees. R. pp. 298-334. On August 21, 2014, eight days after the City 
filed its memorandum of costs, the trial court entered its order granting the request for attorney 
fees and costs. R. pp. 335-337. At the same time, the district court entered the City's proposed 
Declaratory and Monetary Judgment which included attorney fees as costs. R. pp. 338-341. 
On August 22, 2014, one day after the entry of the judgment, the district court entered an 
amended order granting the City's request for attorney fees and costs. R. pp. 342-344. The trial 
court also entered an amended declaratory and monetary judgment. R. pp. 345-349. 
On August 27, 2014, five days after the entry of judgment, IHD filed its objection to the 
memorandum of costs. R. pp. 353-354. IHD's objection was supported by a memorandum and 
affidavits. R. pp. 355-369; AR Affidavit of Douglas S. Marfice filed September 8, 2014. 1 On 
August 27, 2014, IHD also filed its motion for reconsideration of the district court's entry of the 
attorney fee judgment because the order was entered before consideration of IHD' s timely 
objection. R. pp. 350-352. On October 24, 2014, the district court ruled on the motion to 
reconsider. AR Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in Part (As to timing of this Court's 
Prior Decision) and Denying in Part (As to Amount of Attorney Fees Previously Awarded 
Defendant IHD's Motion for Reconsideration of Attorney Fees) filed October 24, 2014. 
Although it appeared the judgments entered by the district court did not comply with 
Rule 54, I.R.C.P, out of an abundance of caution, IHD filed a notice of appeal on September 4, 
1 AR in this brief stands for "Augmented Record". Two augmented records were filed in this matter by IHD. 
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2014. R. pp. 370-373. On September 23, 2014, this Court conditionally dismissed the appeal 
because the order did not comply with Rule 54, I.R.C.P. R. p. 377. On October 17, 2014, IHD 
filed a response to the conditional dismissal, indicating a hearing was scheduled for October 23, 
2014 with the district court to bring the matter of the judgment's compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(a) 
to the district court's attention. R. pp. 378-379. The trial court's decision on reconsideration 
filed October 24, 2014 did not address the non-compliance issue. Id. On October 28, 2014, IHD 
filed a notice of hearing regarding a motion for presentment of judgment. AR Notice of Hearing 
RE: Defendant's Motion for Presentment of Judgment filed October 28, 2014. On November 14, 
2014, prior to the presentment hearing, the trial court entered a second amended declaratory and 
monetary judgment. R. pp. 381-384. On November 24, 2014, the trial court entered a final 
judgment. R. pp. 385-387. 
On December 8, 2014, IHD moved to alter or amend the judgment, and a memorandum 
and an amended memorandum to support its motion to alter or amend the judgment. AR Motion 
to Alter or Amend Judgment filed December 8, 2014; Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed December 8, 2014; and Amended Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed December 8, 2014. On December 30, 
2014, the City filed its response, together with a supporting declaration. AR City of Sandpoint' s 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed December 30, 2015; AR 
Declaration of C. Matthew Andersen filed December 30, 2014. 
On February 4, 2015, IHD filed a notice of hearing on its motion to alter or amend the 
judgment. AR Notice of Hearing re: Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed 
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February 4, 2015. On March 26, 2015, IHD filed a second amended notice of hearing of the 
motion to alter or amend the judgment. AR Second Amended Notice of Hearing re: Independent 
Highway District's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed March 26, 2015. A reply 
memorandum in support of the motion to alter or amend the judgment was filed April 2, 2015. 
AR Reply Memorandum in support of Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed 
April 2, 2015. On April 10, 2015, the trial court filed its order denying the motion to alter or 
amend the judgment. R. p. 388-390. 
C. Statement of Facts 
The JP A was entered between the City and IHD in 2003 to resolve then pending litigation 
between the entities. R. pp. 3 7-41. The JP A provided IHD would "pay over to the City all 
property tax funds from such District levies on all property located within the city limits." R. p. 
3 9. The JP A acknowledged that IHD had the powers provided by Idaho Code section 40-1310, 
and purported to transfer IHD's jurisdiction to the City over IHD streets located within the City. 
R.p. 37. 
By its term, the JP A indicates it is perpetual. "The duration of this agreement shall be 
perpetual or until such time as the District and the City jointly and together agree to amend or 
terminate the same." (Emphasis added.) R. p. 37. The JPA contains no provision for IHD to 
terminate, modify, or renegotiate the agreement. In 2005, an MOU was entered which 
supplemented the terms JPA and delegated to the City IHD's jurisdiction to conduct street 
vacations and hold public hearings to vacate IHD streets located within the City. R. pp. 43-44. 
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None of the current IHD elected Commissioners signed the JP A. R. p. 41. The 2013 
IHD Board of Commissioners made numerous requests to the City to renegotiate the JP A. 
Affidavit of Marj Tilley. R. p. 233. The City declined or failed to respond to IHD's requests to 
negotiate. R. p. 241. On July 11, 2013, IHD notified the City it believed the JPA was illegal and 
made an offer to resolve outstanding differences. R. pp. 45-46. After receiving no response from 
the City, on July 25, 2013, IHD notified the City it elected to terminate the illegal JPA. R. p. 47. 
Rather than responding to IHD's request for negotiation and offer of settlement, the City sued 
IHD, claiming breach of contract; seeking a declaration of the City's rights; and for preliminary 
and permanent injunction, which lawsuit is the subject of this appeal. 
IHD responded to the suit by seeking a dismissal and ruling that the JP A was 
unconstitutional and violated certain provisions ofldaho statute. R. pp. 49-53; 56-72. Once the 
trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the City sought summary judgment on all issues. R. pp. 
187-193. Notwithstanding the clear holdings from this Court, the trial court issued a summary 
judgment holding that the JP A complies with A1i. VIII, § 3 based upon six conclusions: 1) The 
JP A creates no indebtedness or a liability in violation of Art. VIII, § 3; 2) Art. VIII, § 3 does not 
apply to agreements entered into between two political subdivisions; 3) The JP A is legal because 
it does not obligate IHD general revenues; 4) Art. VIII, § 3 applies only to the purchase of 
systems and goods; 5) the JP A is legitimized by the special funds doctrine; and 6) the JP A 
follows the Idaho Joint Powers Act. R. pp. 154-175. The trial court also issued a monetary 
judgment which is the subject of this appeal. R. pp. 385-387. 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the trial court err in holding that the Joint Powers Agreement complies with 
Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution? 
B. Did the trial court err in holding the Joint Powers Agreement complies with the 
Idaho Joint Powers Act, Idaho Code§ 67-2326, et seq.? 
C. Did the trial court err in its declaration of the City's rights under the JP A and the 
MOU? 
D. Did the trial court err in awarding damages to the City for breach of contract? 
E. Did the trial court err in holding that the JP A references to "taxes" included 
penalties and interest? 
F. Did the trial court err in the form of the permanent injunction it issued? 
G. Did the trial court err in its award of attorney fees? 
H. Should a new trial judge be assigned on remand? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the 
same as that of the district court in ruling upon the motion. Purvis v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 
142 Idaho 213, 215, 127 P.3d 116, 118 (2005); citing, Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 
473, 475-76, 150 P.3d 488, 490-91 (2002). Therefore, this Court reviews the record before the 
district court, including the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, if any, to determine 
de nova whether, after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
there exist any genuine issues of material fact and whether the successful movant below was 
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id; citing, Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 
740 P.2d 1022 (1987); and I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
"This Court defers to the factual findings of the district court unless those findings are 
clearly erroneous. This Court exercises free review of the district court's application of the 
relevant law to the facts. Constitutional issues are questions of law over which we also exercise 
free review." City of Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574, 576, 237 P.3d 1200, 1202 (2010) 
(quoting City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2, 137 P.3d 388, 389 (2006))." City of Challis v. 
Consent of the Governed Caucus, 2015 WL 5667481, p. 2 (2015). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court erred in holding that the Joint Powers Agreement complies 
with Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution. 
1. Introduction 
The Idaho Constitution strictly prohibits Idaho political subdivisions from incurring 
multi-year indebtedness or liability without a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors. Indeed, 
Idaho's constitutional prohibition against incurring multi-year obligations by Idaho's local 
governments is one of the most restrictive of all the states. Art. VIII,§ 3, provides: 
No ... [political] subdivision of the state, shall incur any indebtedness. or liability, 
in any manner, or for any purpose, exceeding in that year the income and revenue 
provided for it in such year, without the assent of two thirds (2/3) of the qualified 
electors... Any indebtedness or liability incurred contrary to this provision shall 
be void. (Emphasis added). 
This Court has repeatedly interpreted "that year" and "such year" to mean the year in which the 
obligation was incurred. 
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The disputed 2003 JPA was entered without a vote of the qualified IHD electors. 
Because the JPA created a multi-year indebtedness or liability exceeding 2003 IHD revenue, the 
JP A is void and unenforceable. 
Highway districts may levy ad valorem taxes. Pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-801, 
highway district property tax revenue collected from properties located within a city is 
distributed by the county treasurer fifty percent (50%) to the highway district and fifty percent 
(50%) to the city.2 The disputed JPA requires IHD to distribute to the City 100% of the tax 
revenues generated by IHD property tax levy from properties located within the City. R. p. 39. 
This distribution contradicts Idaho Code section 40-801 and is unique among cities and highway 
districts in the state ofldaho. 
The trial court held that the City is entitled to perpetually receive IHD's share of the 
property tax revenues from IHD levy in addition to the City's share. R. p. 168. The court 
recognized the JPA obligation was a multi-year liability. R. p. 163. However, the court wrongly 
held the multi-year JPA liability complies with Art. VIII, § 3 based on the reasoning that in no 
future year will IHD's obligation exceed its total revenue received for that future year. R. p. 163. 
On appeal, IHD contends the JP A is unconstitutional in violation of the Art. VIII, § 3 prohibition 
against multi-year indebtedness or liability. 
2 Idaho Code § 40-801 provides: " ... the commissioners of highway districts are empowered, for the purpose of 
construction and maintenance of highways and bridges under their respective jurisdictions, to make the following 
highway ad valorem tax levies as applied to the market value for assessment purposes within their districts: (a) Two-
tenths per cent (0.2%) of market value for assessment purposes for construction and maintenance of highways and 
bridges ; provided that if the levy is made upon property within the limits of any incorporated city, fifty per cent 
(50%) of the funds shall be apportioned to that incorporated city." 
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2. The JPA obligation is an indebtedness or liability 
The trial court correctly concluded that: "Because IHD has obligated itself to pay a 
percentage of the annual revenue it collected on ad valorem taxes, it did incur a liability. R. p. 
163. 
The definitions of "indebtedness" and "liability" for Art. VIII, § 3, have been analyzed as 
follows: 
The Idaho Supreme Court has defined "debt" or "indebtedness," within the 
meaning of Art. 8, §3, as an obligation, incurred by the state or municipality, 
which creates a legal duty on its part to pay from its general funds a sum of 
money to another, who occupies the position of a creditor, and who has a lawful 
right to demand payment. "Liability," however, has been given a broader and 
more comprehensive definition than "indebtedness," and refers to all kinds and 
character of debts and obligations for which a municipality may become bound in 
law or justice to perform." This broad, sweeping definition of "liability" was the 
basis of Idaho's unique doctrine of constitutional debt limitation, commencing 
with the leading case of Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, one of the landmark 
decisions in the law of municipal debt limitation. (Footnotes omitted). 
17 Idaho L. Rev. 55 (1980), p. 59. Constitutional Debt Limitations on Local Government in 
Idaho - Article 8, Section 3, Idaho Constitution, Michael C. Moore. 
[W]hat constitutes an "indebtedness or liability" has been a recurring subject of 
litigation over the century since the adoption of the Idaho Constitution. In the 
early case of Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted a far 
more restrictive view of this term than did the courts of most other states, holding 
that the vote approval requirement of article VIII, section 3, applied not only to 
general obligation debt payable from property taxes, but also to indebtedness 
payable solely from the revenues of revenue-producing public works. The Feil 
court rejected the so-called "special fund" doctrine recognized as an exception to 
constitution debt limitation provision in the great majority of jurisdictions. 
Although the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that some types of obligations 
do not constitute "indebtedness or liability" within the meaning of the constitution 
provision, and has also held that the limitation does not apply to certain types of 
entities, it has never retreated from the holding in Feil because special revenue 
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debt is an "indebtedness or liability" within the remaining of article VIII, section 
3 ofidaho's constitution. (Footnotes omitted). 
31 Idaho L. Rev. 417 (1995), p. 455. Idaho Constitution and Local Governments - Selected 
Topics, Michael C. Moore. 
It remains a safe legal proposition that in Idaho, a local government debt or 
liability extending bevond the current year's revenues, whether in general 
obligation or a special revenue obligation, requires voter approval, unless it is 
"ordinary and necessary" or qualifies for one of the other limited exceptions 
recognized by the court. 
Id, p. 456. (Emphasis added). 
Idaho Water Resource Board v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535, 548 P.2d 35 (1978) sheds further 
light on the definitions of indebtedness and liability for obligations created by the state under Art. 
VIII, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution; a similar provision to Art. VIII, § 3 applicable to state 
agencies: 
[A] 'debt' refers to an obligation incurred by the state, which creates a legal duty 
on its part to pay from the general fund a sum of money to another, who occupies 
the position of a creditor, and who has a lawful right to demand payment. It 
contemplates an obligation which is irrevocable and requires for its satisfaction 
levies beyond the appropriations provided by the Legislature to meet the ordinary 
expenses of state government for the fiscal year. 'Liability' as used within our 
constitution, has been afforded a broader and more comprehensive definition. It 
refers to an obligation one is bound in law or justice to perform. 
Kramer, 97 Idaho 535,556,584 P.2d 35, 56 (1978) (emphasis added). 
The JP A created both an indebtedness and a liability. The JP A created a legal duty for 
IHD to pay its ad valorem funds over to the City. The City is in the position of a creditor who 
may demand payment from IHD, i.e., an indebtedness. The City claims in its Complaint that 
IHD is bound in law or justice to make multi-year payments to the City, i.e., a liability. 
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The Art. VIII, § 3 case just decided by this Court, Greater Boise Auditorium District v. 
Frazier, 2015 WL 6080521 (October 15, 2015) ("GBAD"), confirms at p. 8 the breadth of the 
liability definition. "[T]he term 'liability' is a much more sweeping and comprehensive term 
than the word 'indebtedness"', quoting from Charles Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene 23 Idaho 32, 
49, 129 P. 43, 649 (1912). 
3. The JP A obligation is an illegal multi-year obligation 
After correctly acknowledging that the JP A created a liability, the district court 
incorrectly found the obligation complies with Art. VIII, § 3 because any future liability will not 
exceed IHD's revenues for any future year. The court stated "the liability does not exceed the 
income received a year." [Sic]. R. p. 163. From the context of the sentence, it appears that the 
district court meant "in any given year" or "in a future year" at the end of this sentence. The 
district court clarified its ruling by stating "so long as IHD's boundaries equal or exceed the 
City's boundaries, IHD will always receive more revenue than what it has apportioned the City 
each year because it will receive levies from property in the City limits as well as levies from 
property outside the City limits." R. p. 163. The district court reasoned that it is acceptable for 
IHD to obligate future years' revenue if "IHD has not incurred a liability which exceeds its 
revenue (for each future year)". Id. The trial court held that even though the JPA created a long-
term liability, the liability was not precluded by Art. VIII, § 3, because it resulted in a future 
apportionment of revenues. R. p. 163. The trial court's holding is not supported by the language 
of Art. VIII, § 3 or by any Idaho case law and is an improper constitutional analysis. Any multi-
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year obligation which subjects a political subdivision to liability greater than it had the funds to 
pay during the year the obligation was entered violates the Constitution.3 
Williams v. City of Emmett, 51 Idaho 500, 6 P.2d 475 (1931) contradicts the trial court's 
conclusion that potential future revenue can be considered in the constitutional analysis. In 
Williams, the City of Emmett contracted to purchase a street sprinkler system over a three year 
period. The contract was a multi-year lease agreement with an option to purchase, but without a 
non-appropriation clause. This Court stated: "It is quite apparent from the record that the 
necessary revenue to meet the total indebtedness undertaken or liability of this contract was not 
provided for in the year in which it was contracted, pursuant to any bond election or otherwise." 
Williams, 51 Idaho 500,504, 6 P.2d 475,476 (1931) (emphasis added). The appropriate inquiry 
under Art. VIII, § 3 is not whether potential revenue will be available in each future year to 
satisfy an obligation entered in a prior year. Rather, the key question is whether there is revenue 
available to satisfy all future years' obligations in the year the obligation was created. In other 
words, a present liability is created on the date the multi-year obligation is incurred. The 
Williams Court emphasized the reasoning for this strict analysis by quoting with approval from 
the decision of Judge Deitrich in Dexter Horton T & Sav. Bank v. Clearwater County, 235 F. 
743, 754 (Idaho 1916) that: 
The Idaho Constitution is imbued with the spirit of economy, and in so far as 
possible it imposes upon the political subdivisions of the state a pay-as-you-go 
system of finance. The rule is that, without the express assent of the qualified 
electors, municipal officers are not to incur debts for which they have not the 
funds to pay. 
3 There are several exceptions to this rule more fully discussed below. None of the exceptions are applicable to the 
case at bar. 
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Williams, 51 Idaho 500,505, 6 P.2d 475,476 (1931). 
Williams fwiher elaborated on the intention of the constitutional convention by including 
the language of Art. VIII, § 3 within the Idaho Constitution, stating: 
Municipalities in this state have by one engagement or another endeavored to 
acquire property, the cost of which was beyond the revenue provided for it in the 
current year without the bond election and without provision for the annual tax 
required by the Constitution. This of course has always been upon the theory that 
the undertaking on the part of the city in the matter was short of a promise 
constituting an indebtedness as contemplated by the Constitution. By virtue of 
the decisions in such cases, the law with reference to the effect of this section of 
the Constitution is pretty well settled in this state. 
Williams, 51 Idaho 500, 506, 6 P.2d 475, 477 (1931) (emphasis added). The revenue 
availability analysis under Art. VIII, § 3 is based upon the year in which the obligation is 
incurred, not revenue availability for future years. 
Williams then considered the argument that no indebtedness or liability was created 
because payments would be made strictly from the revenue generated from the equipment in 
future years. This argument is sometimes referred to as the special fund doctrine. 
It is claimed that the city may enter into a binding lease for future years for 
services needed in those years; that such an agreement is not creating a present 
indebtedness within the meaning of this constitutional provision. The court 
expressed a contrary view, and we think properly, in Boise Dev. Co. v. Boise City, 
26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531,535. On this point the court said: 
"But if this contract was valid, would not the courts intervene to compel the city 
authorities to comply with all its terms and provisions? Conceding that it is true 
that it would not be 'legally permissible' to call the aggregate amounts in the 
contract to be paid a present debt, then we submit that it would be a 'present 
liability' for such aggregate amounts. If the contract was valid, by its terms 
$1225 would become due at the end of each quarter of each year of its existence, 
as the services were performed, from the beginning of said services to the 
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expiration of the five years for which it was made, and this sum would then be a 
debt, but the city incurred a liability for the aggregate sum of $24,500 at the date 
the contract was executed. "4 
Williams, 51 Idaho, 500, 506-507, 6 P.2d, 475,477 (1931) (emphasis added). The phrases "that 
year" and "such year" contained in A1i. VIII, § 3 mean the year in which the obligation was 
incurred (2003 in this IHD/City case) not the future years in which the payments are owed. 
Similar to the district court's holding, it was argued in Williams that the obligation 
created no multiple year indebtedness or liability but was merely a pledge of future revenues. 
Williams flatly rejected this argument. 
. . . [T]his court has held that a city cannot pledge its revenues from any source 
whatever without creating an indebtedness subject to this constitutional 
restriction. 
Williams, 51 Idaho, 500, 507, 6 P.2d, 475, 477 (1931) (emphasis added). The Williams Court 
upheld the trial court judgment enjoining further performance of the multi-year obligation. 
The holding and reasoning of Williams was reaffirmed in Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 
92 Idaho 512, 446 P.2d 634 (1968) and recently reaffirmed in GBAD, supra. This Court held in 
GBAD that a lease agreement which can be terminated each year does not violate Art. VIII, § 3. 
GBAD relied heavily on Williams, stating that "governmental subdivisions are liable for the 
aggregate payments due over the total term of a contract rather than merely for what is due the 
year in which the contract was entered." GBAD, p. 9. GBAD summarized the reasoning of 
Williams by stating "this Court aggregated all the lease payments to which the governmental 
4 Under the same logic, the JPA created an indebtedness or liability of seven million dollars to IHD over a twenty-
year period. R. pp. 39, 163. Seven million dollars far exceeds IHD's 2003 budget. However since there is no 
method for IHD to terminate the JPA, the liability far exceeds seven million dollars and is mathematically infinite. 
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subdivision had bound itself (in that case the full length of the entire multi-year lease) and used 
that as the measure of 'liability' that the subdivision would need to be able to pay off in the year 
in which it entered the lease." Id "We reaffirm that principle now. The relevant determination 
under Article VIII, section 3 is whether the governmental subdivision presently bound itself to a 
liability greater than it has funds to pay for in the year in which it bound itself." GBAD at p. 10 
(emphasis added). The Court emphasized that the GBAD lease was only valid because the lease 
was renewable year to year at the "sole discretion" of GBAD, p. 13. 
The JP A is unconstitutional because IHD did not have funds on hand in 2003 to satisfy all 
future liabilities created by the JP A. 5 Since the JPA obligated IHD to make multi-year payments 
to the City, all future payments must be considered to test the constitutionality of the JP A. Such 
consideration is compelled because failure to make future payments constitutes a breach of the 
JP A for which IHD is bound in law or in justice as demonstrated by the filing of the present suit. 
The trial court reasoned that the JP A complied with Art. VIII, § 3 because it created only 
a "contingent" liability since IHD would have no liability to the City if IHD levied no property 
taxes. R. p. 161. The court wrongly concluded from this observation that the liability was 
contingent, and Art. VIII, § 3 was not implicated. The trial court cited no authority for its 
analysis that a contingent liability is an exception to the Art. VIII, § 3 prohibition. The trial 
court's reasoning is contradicted by Williams and other Idaho cases. 
Moreover, the JP A mandates that IHD levy property taxes for all future years (R. p. 39), 
so the liability cannot be deemed contingent. IHD is perpetually obligated by the JP A to levy and 
5 The amount paid annually under the JPA by IHD to the City was estimated to be $350,000 in the first year. R. pp. 
39 and 280. 
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pay its portion of ad valorem taxes collected in the future over to the City. Even if, arguendo, the 
JP A liability is analyzed as contingent, this Court stated in GBAD that the framers intended the 
Art. VIII,§ 3 prohibition to apply to contingent liabilities. GBAD, pp. 11-12. 
The Idaho Supreme Comi has repeatedly and consistently held that Art. VIII, § 3 
precludes multi-year obligations such as found in the JP A. This Court comprehensively 
addressed the Art. VIII, § 3 prohibition in the seminal case of Charles Feil v. City of Coeur 
d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912). In Feil, the city entered into a 20-year contract to 
purchase a water system from a contractor for $180,000. The city pledged to make annual 
payments to the contractor from the revenues generated by the water system. This Court held the 
agreement created an "indebtedness or liability" extending beyond the city's budget year in 
violation of Art. VIII, § 3. Feil reviewed the history of Art. VIII, § 3 noting that the language of 
Idaho's constitution is more restrictive than virtually any other state's constitution. This Court 
rejected the city's argument that because numerous other states had upheld similar agreements, 
Idaho courts should follow suit. The Feil Court stated "[ o ]ur constitution specifically prohibits 
anticipating the income or revenue for more than the current year." Feil, 23 Idaho 32, 45, 129 P. 
643, 647 (1912). 
[T]he framers of our constitution employed more sweeping and prohibitive 
language in framing sec. 3 of art. 8, and pronounced a more positive prohibition 
against excessive indebtedness than is to be found in any other constitution to 
which our attention has been directed. 
Feil, 23 Idaho 32, 49, 129 P. 643, 649 (1912). "The constitution not only prohibits incurring any 
indebtedness, but it also prohibits incurring any liability." Id. The intent of the framers was to 
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prevent the pledging of future income including "all sources and kinds of income or revenue" Id 
No Idaho political subdivision "shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner, or for any 
purpose" beyond the current budget year. Feil, 23 Idaho 32, 50, 129 P. 643,649 (1912). 
Feil further discussed the breadth of the term "liability", noting several definitions, 
including " ... the state of one who is bound in law and justice to do something which may be 
enforced by action" and "the state of being bound or obliged in law or justice to do, pay or make 
good something; legal responsibility." Id. Just recently this Court reaffirmed Feil and the 
liability definition discussed in Feil. GBAD, p. 8. The Feil Court elaborated on why a governing 
body should not be allowed to financially obligate future governing bodies. 
Suppose, now, after purchasing this property, another city council hereafter to be 
elected should decline to comply with the promises, agreements and covenants of 
this ordinance. If the ordinance is legal and valid, would not the courts intervene 
to compel the city authorities to comply with the provisions and terms of this 
ordinance and to take such steps as might be necessary to raise the required 
revenue to meet these obligations ... 
Feil, 23 Idaho 32, 53, 129 P. 643,651 (1912). 
Feil noted that the framers endorsed Art. VIII, § 3 as means to prevent Idaho's 
local government agencies from incurring obligations that might bankrupt their future. 
The city in Feil argued that the multi-year agreement was constitutional since it obligated 
only future revenues received from the water system to be financed and did not obligate the 
general revenues of the city- the special fund argument. The Feil Court rejected the city's 
argument, responding that " ... the receipts from this source will at once become an income, under 
the provisions of sec. 3, art. VIII, of the constitution, which it is forbidden to pledge or 
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hypothecate for more than the current year ... " Feil, 23 Idaho 32, 55, 129 P. 643, 651 (emphasis 
added); and "[ a]fter it owns that property, the receipts from water rents would clearly be an 
income or revenue within the purview and meaning of the constitution, but in advance of the 
purchase it undertakes to appropriate and hypothecate that income for a period of twenty years so 
that it may not be an income after the purchase is made." Feil, 23 Idaho 32, 55, 129 P. 643, 651 
(emphasis added). "Feil's analysis of the scope ofldaho's constitutional prohibition that has not 
been superseded by constitutional amendment remains good law." GBAD, p. 8. 
The very concern expressed in Feil and GBAD is now squarely before this Court. The 
City sued IHD to enforce the JP A claiming IHD is obligated in law and in justice to perpetually 
make multi-year payments to the City. The trial court agreed with the City that IHD is liable to 
tum over all future years IHD property tax revenues based upon the JP A. The trial court 
misapplied Feil finding it was unpersuasive authority. Feil remains good law, and its analysis of 
impermissible obligations has been repeatedly reaffirmed. 
In the present case, the 2003 IHD Board pledged all future years' IHD property tax 
revenues. Since the agreement is perpetual and requires mutual consent to terminate, IHD 
remains bound to make future payments from future revenues. IHD's former Board obligated 
itself to perpetually levy real property taxes and pay the revenue from such levy to the City. The 
rationale behind the Constitutional prohibition against pledging future years' revenue is as 
compelling in the present case as it was in Feil and Feil 's progeny. 
The Feil Court stated that the Constitution provides the exclusive method for incurring 
multi-year obligations; specifically, a vote of two-thirds of the electors of the taxing district. 
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Absent such a vote, no obligation may be incurred beyond the current budget year. No such vote 
was held by IHD electors. Based upon Feil and subsequent Idaho cases, the JPA violates Idaho's 
Constitution. 
Feil was followed in Miller v. City of Buhl, 48 Idaho 668,284 P. 843 (1930). The City of 
Buhl attempted to purchase an electricity generating system over multiple years. Buhl pledged 
the future revenues from the sale of power to pay off the purchase price of the system. Citing 
Feil, this Court reaffirmed that Art. VIII, § 3 prohibits Idaho municipalities from incurring 
obligations which extend beyond the year in which the agreement was made. The Court 
declined the invitation to overrule Feil. 
Three recent cases have also reaffirmed Feil. In City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 
137 P.3d 388 (2006), this Court had before it another multi-year obligation entered into by a city. 
This Court followed Feil and held that Idaho's political subdivisions are prohibited by Art. VIII, 
§ 3 from entering into multi-year obligations. 
City of Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574,237 P.3d 1200 (2010), also affirmed the 
prohibition against multi-year obligations. Idaho Falls entered into a 17-year agreement 
obligating the city to future purchases of electricity. The Court held that by creating a multi-year 
obligation, the agreement violated Art. VIII, § 3. The Court noted that the city could incur short-
term obligations within the current budget year, but could not incur obligations extending 
beyond the year in which the agreement was entered. 
The city in Fuhriman argued that its taxpayers would benefit from the certainty of a long 
term contract for the purchase of electricity. This Court responded that even if such an 
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agreement was beneficial to city residents, Art. VIII, § 3 prohibits the city from incun-ing multi-
year obligations. The Court reaffirmed that the Idaho Constitution "imposes upon the political 
subdivisions of the state a pay as you go system of finance." Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574,579, 237 
P.3d 1200, 1205 (2010), citing Frazier. Accord City of Challis v. Consent of the Governed 
Caucus, 2015 WL 5667481 (9/25/15). 
This Court reaffirmed the holding and reasoning of Feil in GBAD. The GBAD obligation 
was upheld only because the political subdivision could annually exercise its rights under a non-
appropriation clause. 
We thus hold that the Center Lease does not subject the District to more liability 
than it could pay in the year in which it was entered and therefore does not violate 
Article VIII, section 3 of the Constitution. 
GBAD, p. 14 (emphasis added). 
And, 
Therefore, we hold that the overall agreement entered into by the District does not 
subject it to a long-term liability greater than it had the funds to pay for in the year 
in which it was entered. 
GBAD, p. 15 (emphasis added). 
The GBAD concun-ing opinion agreed that the measure of liability includes all future 
payments to be made under the agreement. 
If the District was contractually obligated to make lease payments in the future, 
then all of those payments would be aggregated to determine whether the lease 
violated article VIII, section 3. 
GBAD, p. 19. 
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The 2003 IHD commissioners entered into a multi-year obligation to address a difficult 
situation, but in doing so violated the reasoning and holdings in Feil, Buhl, Frazier, Fuhriman 
and GBAD. The district court found that even though the JPA resulted in IHD incurring a multi-
year liability, "the case law cited by IHD (i.e. Feil, Buhl, Frazier and Fuhriman) simply does not 
apply to this case." R. p. 160-161. The court was mistaken. These cases (and now GBAD) 
directly apply, holding that Idaho political subdivisions cannot enter into multi-year obligations 
such as that created by the JP A. 
The trial court relied on Ball v. Bannock County, 5 Idaho 602, 51 P. 454 (1897) for its 
reasoning that Feil is inapplicable and that the JP A complies with Art. VIII, § 3. R. p. 160-161. 
Contrary to the court's analysis, Ball supports IHD's contention that the JPA is unconstitutional. 
In 1893, Bannock County contracted to purchase land for a new courthouse and jail for $4,000. 
The County had 1893 revenue exceeding $30,000. The Court upheld the County's proposed 
issuance of a $4,000 warrant to purchase the land. Art. VIII, § 3 was not violated because the 
County had sufficient 1893 revenue to pay for the 1893 expenditure. The Comi noted had the 
County created an obligation in 1893 to pay for the land in future years after 1893, a violation of 
Art. VIII, § 3 would have occurred. Ball stated "it was the intention of the people (in enacting 
Art. VIII, § 3) to put the several counties, so far as the future was concerned, upon practically a 
cash basis. This object and intent must be observed. Its violation, either directly or indirectly 
cannot be tolerated." Ball, 5 Idaho 602, 605, 51 P. 454, 455. Ball clarified that Idaho political 
subdivisions cannot be allowed to bankrupt themselves or mortgage their future. 
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The court below incorrectly stated that Art. VIII, § 3 "prohibits a political subdivision 
from incurring any indebtedness or liability that exceeds what the subdivision can satisfy in a 
year without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors." (Emphasis added.) R. p. 160. 
The court wrongly concluded that the phrase "in a year" means any future year. 
Such reasoning vitiates Art. VIII, § 3 and defeats the very reason it was placed into Idaho's 
Constitution. By this reasoning, multi-year obligations are permissible if future revenue will be 
available to satisfy future obligations. The framers would be appalled at this interpretation. It is 
not supported by any Idaho appellate decision. The court erred by adopting the City's argument 
that when pledging future year's property tax revenues "a municipality does not violate the 
constitutional prohibition on indebtedness when it pays expenses out of revenue for that year". 
R. p. 160. The trial court's conclusion is contradicted by this Court's admonition that Art. VIII, 
§ 3 allows no Idaho political subdivision "to pledge or hypothecate [income] for more than the 
current year." Feil, 23 Idaho 32, 55, 129 P. 643, 651 (1912). 
This Court stated in the early case of Theiss v. Hunter, 4 Idaho 788, 45 P .2 (1896): 
The evident intent of section 3 of article 8 of the constitution of Idaho and the act 
above cited, was to make the revenue or income collected each year pay such 
year's indebtedness, unless by the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors, 
given as provided by law, other indebtedness was authorized. 
Theiss, 4 Idaho 788, 793, 45 P. 2, 3 (1896) (emphasis added). Had the 2003 IHD Board 
obligated only 2003 revenue, that agreement would have met the Theiss criteria. However, by 
executing the 2003 JP A, IHD obligated IHD revenue for each year - 2003 to the present - and all 
future years, in violation of Art. VIII, § 3. 
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4. There is no exception to Article VIII, § 3 for agreements between political 
subdivisions 
The trial court concluded that: 
.. . Frazier, Feil and Fuhriman are all cases involving the municipal purchases of 
systems or goods from private parties that the municipality would be liable from 
its general revenues and those are simply not the facts in this case .... the case law 
cited by IHD does not apply to this case." 
R. p. 161. (Emphasis in original). The court ruled that Art. VIII, § 3 does not apply to an 
agreement between two government agencies. The comi cited no authority for this conclusion. 
The language of Art. VIII, § 3 does not contain this exception. IHD is unaware of any Idaho 
commentator who supports grafting such an exception onto Art. VIII, § 3. Indeed, the reasoning 
of every Idaho Supreme Court Art. VIII, § 3 case is opposed to the judicial creation of such an 
exception. 
In Williams, this Court stated that no undertaking by a political subdivision is legal unless 
there is adequate revenue to support the undertaking "in the year in which it was contracted." 
Williams v. City of Emmett, 51 Idaho 500,504, 6 P.2d 475,476 (1931). Williams also held that 
an Idaho political subdivision cannot "pledge its revenues from any source whatever". Williams, 
51 Idaho 500, 507, 6 P.2d, 475,477 (1931). An Idaho political subdivision cannot incur a multi-
year obligation "in any manner or purpose," Boise Development Company, 26 Idaho 347, 361, 
143 P. 531, 535 (1914). None of this reasoning supports an analysis that Art. VIII, § 3 applies 
only to agreements with "private parties." 
The language of Art. VIII, § 3 itself states the breadth of the prohibition by prohibiting 
such debt "in any manner or for any purpose." No exception was created for obligations entered 
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into between Idaho political subdivisions. The framers enacted Art. VIII, § 3 to prevent Idaho 
political subdivisions from bankrupting themselves and their taxpayers or mortgaging their 
future. It is illogical to prohibit a political subdivision from bankrupting itself by entering into a 
multi-year obligation with a private party, but to allow the same political subdivision to bankrupt 
itself by entering into a multi-year obligation with a government agency. Based upon clear Idaho 
precedent and the broad language of Art. VIII, § 3, the prohibition applies whether the creditor is 
a private party or a government agency. 
5. The JP A obligates IHD general revenue 
The trial court reasoned that Art. VIII, § 3 applies only to the pledge of future "general 
revenues", curiously reasoning that IHD property tax revenues do not constitute IHD general 
revenues. R. p. 161. Under Idaho Code section 40-801, highway districts may levy ad valorem 
property taxes within their districts for maintenance and construction of highways and bridges. 
The County collects the tax revenues. The revenue generated from ad valorem taxes is 
distributed by counties into the highway district's general fund. The trial judge's assertion these 
funds are not "future general revenues" is wrong. 
Under well settled Idaho law, it is irrelevant whether the property tax revenue is general 
revenue. Even if the property tax revenue is characterized as special revenue, it is illegal under 
Feil and its progeny for an Idaho political subdivision to obligate future years' revenues. 
25 
6. Article VIII, § 3 is not limited to the purchase of systems or goods 
The trial court reasoned that Art. VIII, § 3 applies only to an indebtedness or liability for 
the purchase of a system or goods . 
. . . Frazier, Feil and Fuhriman are all cases involving the municipal purchases of 
systems or goods from private pmiies that the municipality would be liable from 
its general revenues and those are not the facts in this case .... the case law cited by 
IHD does not apply to this case." 
R. p. 161. (Emphasis added) 
There is no support in Idaho law for limiting Art. VIII, § 3 only to purchases of systems 
or goods. At least four Art. VIII, § 3 cases dealt with obligations for purposes other than the 
purchase of systems or goods, i.e. Ball, Dexter, Boise Development Co. and GBAD. In Boise 
Development Company, Ltd v. Boise City, 26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531 (1914), this Court held that a 
multi-year obligation entered into by the City of Boise violated Art. VIII, § 3. The obligation in 
Boise Development was not entered into for the purchase of systems or goods. Rather, it 
provided payments arising out of tort liability. While analyzing the breadth of the prohibition of 
Art. VIII, § 3, this Court communicated a familiar refrain: 
The courts to whose decisions we have above referred have indulged in various 
subtleties and refinements of reasoning to show that no debt or indebtedness is 
incurred where a municipality buys certain property and specifically provides that 
no liability shall be incurred by the city, but that the property shall be paid for out 
of a special fund to be raised from the income and revenue from such property. 
The reasoning, however utterly fails when applied to our constitution, because 
none deals with the word 'liability,' which is used in our constitution, and which 
is a much more sweeping and comprehensive term than the word 'indebtedness'; 
nor are the words 'in any manner or for any purpose' given any special attention 
by the courts in the foregoing cases. The framers of our constitution were not 
content to say that no city shall incur any indebtedness 'in any manner or for any 
purpose,' but they rather preferred to say that no city shall incur any indebtedness 
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or liability in any manner, or for any purpose. It must be clear to the ordinary 
mind on reading this language that the framers of the constitution meant to cover 
all kinds and character of debts and obligations for which a city may become 
bound, and to preclude circuitous and evasive methods of incurring debts and 
obligations to be met by the city or its inhabitants. 
Boise Development Company, Ltd, 16 Idaho 347,361, 143 P. 531,535 (1914), quoting from Feil 
with approval ( emphasis added). 
Boise Development reiterates that the Art. VIII, § 3 prohibition applies to "all kinds and 
character of debts and obligations". It is not limited to the purchase of systems or goods. 
See also, Dexter Horton Trust & Savings Bank v. Clearwater County, 235 F. 743 (D. Idaho 
1916), where the federal district court held the issuance of warrants for payment of labor 
incurred to value timber properties violated the prohibition of Art. VIII, § 3. Likewise, Ball v. 
Bannock County, 5 Idaho 602, 51 P. 454 (1897) held that Art. VIII, § 3 prohibits multi-year 
obligations for the purchase of land. Both Dexter and Ball did not limit Art. VIII, § 3 to the 
purchase of a "system or goods". Finally, GBAD involved a real property lease, not the purchase 
of a "system or goods". The policy behind Art. VIII, § 3 mandates that no multi-year debt or 
liability be incurred for any purpose without a vote of the electors. It is not limited to the 
purchase of systems or goods. 
7. Idaho rejects the special fund doctrine 
The trial court stated: 
Feil and Miller were cases where expenses were invalidated because neither fell 
into a special fund exception (i.e., bonds paid by revenue from the services of the 
plant that was financed by the bond), but this later became an exception that was 
amended into Article 8, § 3. 
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R. p. 162. The trial court concluded that the special fund doctrine applies to the facts of this 
case. It does not. 
The special fund doctrine allows special revenues to be used to pay multi-year 
obligations if the general revenues of the political subdivision do not become liable to pay for the 
obligations. While many states have adopted the special fund doctrine as an exception to their 
debt limitation provisions, this Court has repeatedly rejected the doctrin.e as contrary to Art. VIII, 
§ 3. In Feil, Buhl, Williams, Fuhriman and Frazier, the obligations were to be paid using the 
proceeds generated from the water systems, electrical generating systems, a sprinkler system and 
a parking garage rather than general fund revenues. The cities argued in each case that under the 
special fund doctrine the obligations did not violate Art. VIII, § 3 because the general revenues 
of the cities were not at risk. This Court declined in each case to create a special fund exception 
to Art. VIII, § 3. Even if the obligation created is not an indebtedness, the obligation is still an 
illegal liability. Once the revenues are generated they become revenues of the political 
subdivision, which cannot be pledged on a long-term basis without approval by a two-thirds vote 
of qualified electors, regardless of how the revenues are characterized. 
Unlike many other state supreme courts, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
rejected the "special fund" doctrine, which has been summarized by the Idaho 
Supreme Court as a holding that "a municipality does not contract indebtedness or 
incur liability, within the constitutional limitation, by undertaking an obligation 
which is to be paid out of a special fund consisting entirely of revenue or income 
from the property purchased or constructed."... The special fund doctrine would 
allow municipalities to issue "revenue bonds," meaning bonds or other 
indebtedness secured and paid solely by revenue generated by the financed 
facility, without holding an election and levying a tax to repay the obligations, as 
would otherwise be required by article VIII, section 3. Article VIII, section 3 has 
been amended numerous times, to add certain limited "special fund" concepts by 
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permitting, for certain entities for certain projects, the ability to incur 
indebtedness secured by something other than a dedicated tax; however, incurring 
such indebtedness still requires a vote. A complete exception from the 
requirements of article VIII, section 3 exists for port districts and entities issuing 
indebtedness to finance industrial development. (Footnotes omitted) (Emphasis 
added) 
Not to Build: City of Boise v. Frazier Further Restricts Local Governments' Ability to Finance 
Public Projects by S.C. Danielle Quade, 43 Idaho Law Review, p. 329, 331 (2007). 
Idaho has adopted several constitutional amendments which authorize the special fund 
doctrine in limited circumstances. These amendments apply only to specific subjects which are 
not applicable to this case. 
Art. VIII, § 3A was added in 1974 to allow the issuance of multi-year revenue bond 
financing for pollution control, if approved by a majority of the electors. Art. VIII, § 3B was 
added in 1978 to permit the issuance of multi-year revenue bond financing for port district 
facilities and projects. Art. VIII, § 3C was added in 1996 to allow multi-year financing for 
hospitals and health services. Art. VIII, § 3D was added in 2010 to permit a city owning a 
municipal electric system to enter into multi-year agreements, with a vote of a majority of the 
electors to finance electric facilities. Art. VIII, § 3E was added in 2010 to allow multi-year 
financing for airports and airport related projects. None of these amendments apply to the JP A 
or the case now before this Court. 
The trial judge reasoned that "Feil and Miller were cases where expenses were 
invalidated because neither fell into a special fund exception (i.e. bonds paid by revenue from the 
services of the plant that was financed by the bond) but this later became an exception that was 
amended into Art. VIII,§ 3. See Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432,439, 670 P.2d 839, 846. 
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(1983)." R. p. 162. The trial court's reliance on Asson was misplaced. A correct reading of 
Asson establishes thatAsson reaffirmed Idaho's rejection of the special fund doctrine. 
Asson addressed a multi-year indebtedness incurred by several Idaho cities for the 
purchase of electricity. The bond holders urged that the obligation should be upheld under the 
special fund doctrine since the cities' payment obligations were to be satisfied out of utility 
revenues alone. The Court stated the argument as: 
It is urged we ovemlle Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 195 P. 643 
(1912), and apply the "special fund" doctrine. That doctrine, accepted by a great 
majority of cases, holds that a municipality does not contract indebtedness or 
incur liability, within the constitutional limitation, by undertaking an obligation to 
be paid out of a special fund consisting entirely of revenue or income from the 
property purchased or constructed. 
Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 438, 670 P.2d 839, 845. This Court again declined the 
request to ovemlle Feil and its progeny or to reverse course on its long-standing rejection of the 
special fund doctrine. 
Asson noted that subsequent constitutional amendments allowed the limited application 
of the special fund doctrine to specific circumstances, such as water and sewer systems and 
treatment plants, port districts, recreation, navigation and electrical generating facilities. Except 
for these narrow areas adopted by constitutional amendment, there is no general acceptance of 
the special fund doctrine in Idaho. 
The Asson Court stated: 
The intent of the framers of the constitutional amendments, and the electorate 
through their ratification, is clear that approval of a municipality's qualified voters 
is necessary whether its Art. 8, § 3 indebtedness or liability is against the general 
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fund of the city, and its tax revenues, or limited to a special fund of project-
generated revenues. 
Asson, 105 Idaho 432,439,670 P.2d 839, 846 (1983). 
And: 
Were we to accept the argument that the cities' liability comes under the special 
funds doctrine, the indebtedness would still be without constitutional authority 
because Art. 8, §3, requires voter approval of qualifying indebtedness regardless 
of the method or source of repayment. 
Asson, 105 Idaho 432,440,670 P.2d, 839, 847 (1983). 
Asson stands for the opposite of what the trial court cited it for. Idaho case law 
demonstrates that even dedicated funds become future revenues of a political subdivision. Any 
agreement to obligate future revenues violates Art. VIII, § 3, because such agreements are 
binding on future governing boards and diminish the budget authority of future elected officials 
and the voters who elect them, unless such expenditures fit within adopted constitutional 
amendments. The Asson analysis is confirmed in GBAD that Art. VIII, § 3 prohibits any 
"financial requirement... which could bind future officials or taxpayers." GBAD, p. 13. 
8. The ordinary and necessary proviso does not apply here 
IHD anticipates that the City may argue the ordinary and necessary proviso legitimizes 
the JP A. It does not. The Art. VIII, § 3 proviso states: "Provided, that this section shall not be 
construed to apply to the ordinary and necessary expenses authorized by the general laws of the 
state." 
An expense is "ordinary" if in the ordinary course of the transaction of municipal 
business, or the maintenance of municipal property, it may be and is likely to become necessary. 
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Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 446 P.2d 634 (1968). '"Ordinary' means regular; 
usual; normal; common; often recurring; . . . not characterized by peculiar or unusual 
circumstances; ... " City of Pocatello v. Peterson, 93 Idaho 774,778,473 P.2d 644 (1970). 
There is nothing "ordinary" about one public agency agreeing to forever transfer its 
property taxes to another public agency. 
City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 137 P.3d 388 (2006), examined the "necessary" 
component of the proviso and concluded that necessary is limited only to expenditures made 
during the budget year the obligation is entered into, and only if the necessity is urgent. 
Here, we return to the test stated in Dunbar and hold that in order for an 
expenditure to qualify as "necessary" under the proviso clause of Art. 8, § 3 there 
must exist a necessity for making the expenditure at or during such year. 
(Emphasis added) 
Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 5, 137 P.3d 388,392 (2006). 
City of Challis v. Consent of the Governed Caucus, 2015 WL 5667481 (9/25/15) is the 
most recent case to analyze the ordinary and necessary proviso. This Court did not waiver from 
its conservative approach to multi-year obligations undertaken by Idaho's political subdivisions. 
The question was whether an upgrade to the city's water system qualified for the ordinary and 
necessary exception. The majority opinion stayed the course with the Dunbar test discussed in 
Frazier. Specifically, to qualify for the ordinary and necessary proviso, the expenditure must be 
urgent within the current budget year. The JP A does not meet the necessary component of the 
proviso since it was not urgent in 2003 that all future years' IHD property taxes be granted to the 
City. 
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The dissenting opinion in Challis urged more flexibility in interpreting "necessary". 
However, neither the majority opinion nor the dissent urged any variance to the strict prohibition 
against multi-year obligations where, as here, the obligation is neither ordinary nor necessary. 
9. Policy considerations require the conclusion that the JP A is 
unconstitutional 
Under Idaho Code section 40-801, the City has control over its half of IHD levy revenue, 
and IHD has control over the other half. The City may well decide that its priority for IHD levy 
proceeds is for aesthetic items such as landscaping, traffic chokers, and pathways. IHD may 
decide that its highest priorities are street maintenance and construction to better facilitate the 
transportation of people and goods. It is possible neither elected body may agree with the 
priorities established by the other elected body. So long as each entity has authority over how its 
half of ad valorem taxes collected pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-801, is spent, there is no 
violation of. Art. VIII, § 3. Art VIII, § 3 was violated when IHD obligated itself in perpetuity to 
have no authority over how IHD's future revenues are spent. 
The problem with a perpetual and mandatory diversion to the City of all IHD property tax 
revenues collected from City prope1iies is that future IHD Boards of Commissioners lose the 
ability to determine priorities for how IHD property tax revenues should be spent to address 
future issues faced by IHD. Based upon the trial court holding, all future IHD Commissioners 
forever forego their statutory authority to set policy regarding whether to levy property taxes and 
how IHD tax revenues should be spent. Worse yet, it impairs the ability of voters and IHD 
taxpayers to elect new IHD commissioners who will follow the priorities of the electorate. The 
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trial court's ruling greatly diminishes the accountability to voters and taxpayers because future 
IHD Commissioners have no voice in how future IHD property tax revenues are used. This is 
contrary to the legislative intent in specifying the sharing ratio found in Idaho Code section 40-
801. It is also contrary to the intent of the framers of the Idaho Constitution. This Court 
emphasized this very point by expressing that the key point to Art. VIII, § 3 analysis is that a 
multi-year agreement such as the JPA cannot "bind future officials or taxpayers." GBAD, p. 13. 
Ifa 2015 IHD Board of Commissioners decides to pay its 2015 tax revenues to the City, 
then those Commissioners are accountable to the voters for that decision at the next election. 
However, if a 2003 IHD Board may determine how a 2015 IHD Board must distribute 2015 IHD 
tax revenues, there is no accountability to 2015 voters for that decision. IHD electors lose their 
ability to elect Commissioners who will act based upon the priorities of those electors; which 
priorities may differ from the priorities of the 2003 Commissioners. If the JP A were held to be 
enforceable into perpetuity, the very reason Art. VIII, § 3 was placed into the Idaho Constitution 
is defeated. 
10. Since the JP A violates Article VIII, § 3, it is void 
Any agreement which violates Art. VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution is "void" under the 
express language of this Constitutional provision and under Idaho case law. See e.g. Deer Creek 
Highway Dist. v. Doumecq Highway Dist., 37 Idaho 601,218, P. 371 (1923); and Boise Dev. Co. 
v. City of Boise, 26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531 (1914) (affirming that agreements which violate Art. 
VIII, § 3 are void). 
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If this Court agrees that the JP A is void, it need not consider the arguments found at B, C 
and D below. 
B. The trial court erred by holding the JP A complies with the 
Idaho Joint Powers Act 
1. The JP A has no real duration or termination clause 
The trial court wrongly concluded that the JP A complies with the Idaho Joint Powers 
Act, Idaho Code section 67-2326, et seq. (the "Act"). The Act requires that "Any such 
agreement shall specify the following: 1) its duration, and 5) ... methods ... (for) termination of 
the agreement ... " Idaho Code section 67-2328. The JPA provides that "the duration of this 
agreement shall be perpetual or until such time as the District and the City jointly and together 
agree to amend or terminate the same." R. p. 37. (Emphasis added). Under the terms of the 
JP A, IHD cannot modify or terminate the "perpetual" agreement without the consent of the City. 
Absent the agreement of the City, the agreement lasts forever. 
The trial court ruled that the JP A has a specified duration; that "perpetual" is a duration 
for purposes of the Act. "Perpetual" cannot be a duration contemplated by the Idaho Legislature 
when adopting the Act. It is illogical to require that an agreement specify a duration and then 
conclude that the agreement can last forever. If an agreement can last forever, there is no reason 
for the requirement that the agreement specify a duration and methods for termination, and the 
statutory language would be rendered meaningless. Courts do not favor construction of a statute 
which lead to an absurd result. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 
(2007). 
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The language and the logic of the Act require there be a method for termination. The 
JP A is not saved by the language that it can be modified by the mutual agreement of both parties. 
Modification or termination of the JPA only by mutual agreement is illusory. It gives each party 
absolute veto power over any attempt by the other party to terminate the JP A. IHD is forever 
bound unless the City consents to negotiation or termination. Here, IHD repeatedly requested 
that the City renegotiate the JPA. R. p. 233. All such requests were unsuccessful. R. p. 233. 
IHD notified the City of IHD 's desire to terminate the JP A and offered the City a settlement 
agreement. R. pp. 45-56. The City responded by suing. 
The City has every incentive to decline IHD's requests to negotiate or terminate the 
agreement. Under the agreement, the City receives IHD property taxes it would not otherwise 
receive. Because there is no effective termination clause, there will never be a realistic 
opportunity for IHD to terminate the agreement. 
The term "duration" is not defined in the Act nor has the term as used in the Act been 
defined by this Court. However, assistance is provided by Black's Law Dictionary which defines 
"duration" as: 
The length of time something lasts. 
Black's Law Dictionary, 898 (Bryan A. Gardner 9th ed., West 2009). 
A specified duration and method of termination requires there be a limited term, not an 
open-ended perpetual existence with no method for renegotiation. The legislative requirements 
of duration and termination clauses in agreements between Idaho public agencies is particularly 
compelling because ofldaho's constitutional prohibition against multi-year obligations. 
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2. The City and IHD lacked authority under the Joint Powers Act to 
transfer jurisdiction over City streets. 
In City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 72 P.3d 905 
(2003) (Sandpoint 111) this Court analyzed the jurisdiction of the City and IHD over streets 
within the city and reaffirmed City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 126 
Idaho 145, 879 P.2d 1078 (1994) (''Sandpoint I"). This Court carefully reviewed the statutes that 
granted jurisdiction to each entity to determine when the City's right to exercise jurisdiction over 
the streets within its city limits was triggered. After exploring the different statutes granting 
jurisdiction to each entity, this Court announced " ... we hold that the City cannot obtain 
jurisdiction over city streets that are within the boundaries of the District unless the District's 
jurisdiction over those streets is first lawfully terminated under the appropriate statutory 
provisions." Sandpoint III, 139 Idaho 65, 70, 72 P.3d 905, 910. The methods of termination of 
IHD's jurisdiction discussed in the opinion were detachment from IHD pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 40-1601 et seq. or by dissolution ofIHD as provided in LC. section 40-1811 and section 
40-1814, Id, 139 Idaho at 68, 72 P.3d at 908-909. 
Following the announcement of the above decision on June 19, 2003, IHD and the City 
discussed settling the then pending litigation. In a letter to the Mayor of the City dated June 24, 
2003, IHD's attorney indicated "SIHD would agree to a stipulated court settlement giving 
Sandpoint jurisdiction over its streets, despite the Supreme Court ruling." R. p. 103. Thereafter, 
on July 3, 2003, a stipulation for settlement was executed by the parties in the underlying 
litigation. R. pp. 32-36. This stipulation stated that the City would have jurisdiction and control 
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over all streets within the city limits and a joint powers agreement would be utilized to recognize 
the City's jurisdiction. R. p. 35. On July 8, 2003, the IPA was executed by the City and IHD. 
R. pp. 3 7-41. In the purpose section of the JP A, it was stated that the purpose of the agreement 
was to divide the jurisdiction of streets and public rights of way within the boundaries of IHD 
between IHD and the City. R. p. 37. "The City shall exercise exclusive general supervisory 
authority over all streets and public rights-of-way within the city limits ... " R. p. 37, and that "the 
City will have the final say over all street matters within its boundaries." R. p. 39. 
This Court was clear in its decision in Sandpoint 111 there were two methods of 
terminating IHD's jurisdiction over city streets: detachment or dissolution of IHD. The issue 
before the district court was whether a third method, a JP A, could terminate IHD' s jurisdiction. 
IHD argued that it could not delegate away or exceed its statutory authority when 
entering into a joint agreement. R. p. 67. The district court acknowledged IHD's argument. R. 
p. 167. In its analysis of this issue, the trial court held Idaho Code section 67-2328(a) of the 
Joint Powers Act allows for state or public agencies to exercise their powers jointly provided 
each has power over the common subject matter. R. p. 169. However, it did not address the 
argument, instead holding "[t]he Court's decision above that IHD has not violated the Idaho 
Constitution in entering into this agreement thus effects (sic) this Joint Powers argument raised 
by IHD." Id While it is not clear what the district court meant by this statement, it is clear the 
district court did not address the jurisdiction issue raised by IHD. 
a) Any power, privilege or authority, authorized by the Idaho 
Constitution, statute or charter, held by the state of Idaho or a public 
agency of said state, may be exercised and enjoyed jointly with the state 
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of Idaho or any other public agency of this state having the same powers, 
privilege or authority; but never beyond the limitation of such powers. 
privileges or authority; 
*** 
The state or any public agency thereof when acting jointly with another 
public agency of this state may exercise and enjoy the power, privilege 
and authority conferred by this act; but nothing in this act shall be 
construed to extend the jurisdiction. power, privilege or authority of the 
state or public agency thereof, beyond the power, privilege or authority 
said state or public agency might have if acting alone. 
Idaho Code section 67-2328(a) (emphasis added). 
The fundamental aspect of this statute is to allow a contract between two ( or more) public 
agencies to exercise, jointly, all power(s) common to each to accomplish specific goals they may 
have in common. It does not authorize transfer of jurisdiction from one public agency to 
another. Contrary to the district court's view, the statute allows public agencies to exercise the 
powers jointly only if both have power over the common subject matter. Sandpoint I and 
Sandpoint III held IHD has jurisdiction over city streets. The City does not. The JP A establishes 
no agreement for the exercise of both public agencies to jointly exercise their powers to maintain 
the streets. Instead, it intended to terminate IHD's jurisdiction over streets within the City's 
limits. The purpose section of the JP A acknowledges this intent. In a section entitled 
"Jurisdiction, Maintenance and Control", the agreement indicates the City shall exercise 
exclusive general supervisory authority over all the streets and public rights of way within the 
city limits. R. p. 37. The supervisory authority includes the right to vacate, abandon and 
relinquish IHD streets and rights of way. R. p. 38. 
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The problem with the above clause is it grants powers to the City that IHD and City do 
not hold in common. Only highway districts have the jurisdiction to abandon and vacate 
highway district streets and public rights of way. See Idaho Code section 40-203. This clause 
purports to extend the jurisdiction of the City beyond the power it would have if acting alone 
because the City does not hold the power to abandon or vacate IHD streets and rights of way. 
For example, street vacations require public hearings. See Idaho Code section 40-203. Agencies 
cannot delegate their statutory duty to conduct public hearings to another agency. See Blaha v. 
Board of Ada County Com 'rs, 134 Idaho 770, 9 P.3d 1236 (2000). 
The City also requested the Court declare the validity of a subsequent Memorandum of 
Understanding executed by the City on August 18, 2005 and by IHD on September 14, 2005. R. 
pp. 43-44. This agreement also purported to give the City the rights and power to vacate IHD 
streets and rights of way. As argued above, the City does not hold this power in common with 
IHD, and the Memorandum of Understanding violates the Joint Powers Act. 
Finally, the JP A fails to provide for the joint exercise of power. The agreement 
establishes no separate legal entity to conduct the joint or cooperative undertaking. It does not 
provide for an administrator or a joint board responsible for administering the joint or 
cooperative undertaking as required under Idaho Code section 67-2328(d)(l) in the absence of a 
separate legal entity. This omission is not surprising since the intent of the agreement was to 
terminate IHD's jurisdiction without following statutory provisions rather than conduct a joint or 
cooperative undertaking as contemplated by the Joint Powers Act. The JP A in this instance was 
contrary to the statute. 
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3. The City and IHD exceeded their statutory authority when executing the 
JPA 
The Joint Powers Act prohibits Idaho political subdivisions from acting in excess of their 
authority. See Idaho Code section 67-2328(a). Because executing the IPA violated Art. VIII, § 
3 of the Idaho Constitution, it was not within the power of the 2003 IHD Board or the City to 
enter into the 2003 Agreement. 
C. The district court erred in declaring the City's rights under the JPA and the 
MOU 
In its verified complaint, the City requested the trial comi issue a declaratory judgment 
upholding the Stipulation for Settlement entered into by the parties in a previous lawsuit and 
approved by the district court in that lawsuit which required IHD to transfer to the City all ad 
valorem taxes collected by IHD. R. p. 30. The City also contended in its verified complaint that ad 
valorem taxes included penalties and interest collected on delinquent taxes from property owners 
within the City. R. p. 27. 
The Stipulation for Settlement was a stipulation entered into in the previous suit between the 
parties in Bonner County Case No. CV-00-00615. R. p. 32. Paragraph 2 of the stipulation indicated 
the parties would enter into a joint powers agreement incorporating the terms of the stipulation. R. 
p. 35. The stipulation provided "[t]he joint powers agreement would provide that the Sandpoint 
Independent Highway District pay over to the City of Sandpoint all ad valorem property tax funds 
received from levies by IHD upon all property located within the city limits." Id The district court 
entered an order approving the stipulation for settlement on July 11, 2003. R. pp. 99-100. A 
negotiation letter executed near the time of the stipulation indicated that IHD would pay over to the 
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City all of the property tax funds received from City residents. R. pp. 103-104. No discussion of 
sharing oflate charges or interest on delinquencies was discussed in this offer letter. Id 
The City filed a summary judgment in this case and presented a short four page 
memorandum in support of its motion that incorporated its memorandum in opposition to IHD's 
motion to dismiss. R. pp. 190-194. IHD opposed the motion because material questions of fact 
prevented entry of a summary judgment on the issue of payment of penalties and interest to the 
City. R. pp. 246-247. In reply, the City conceded IHD had only paid the City delinquent taxes, but 
not penalty and interest through the years. R. p. 264. Despite recognizing this fact, the City argued 
since Idaho Code section 40-805 required the county treasurer to pay IHD delinquent taxes and 
penalty and interest, by definition delinquent taxes included penalty and interest. R. pp. 263-264. 
The trial court concluded it made no sense that the accompanying interest and penalties paid with 
delinquent taxes were not similarly paid over to the City. R. p. 264. 
The district court in its memorandum decision observed the parties' agreement included the 
following clause: 
The District at the present time and in the future will levy and apply for ad valorem 
property taxes under the authority granted in Chapter 13, Title 40, Idaho Code. The 
District will pay over to the City all property tax funds from such District levies on all 
property located within the city limits. 
On the basis of present tax rates this amount is presently approximately $350,000 per year. 
District, upon receipt of tax revenues, forward to the City all tax revenues received by the 
District . . . [sic]. 
R. p. 280 ( emphasis included in district court memorandum decision). 
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Based upon this language, the district court held the contract was clear and unambiguous as 
a matter of law regarding the terms in bold and held a plain reading of the JP A required IHD to tum 
over penalties and interest collected on delinquent taxes. R. p. 280. The trial court, utilizing 
Black's law dictionary, took the broadest interpretation of the term "tax" available, noting it 
"embraces all governmental impositions on ... prope1iy .... " Id. The district court also reasoned that 
revenue was defined as "gross income or receipts" by Black's Law Dictionary. Id Based on these 
definitions, the Court concluded that "all tax revenues" and "all property tax funds" encompassed 
the gross amount of money collected under IHD levy from City properties in relation to the ad 
valorem tax, including interest and costs collected pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-805. Id 
It is well settled that the determination of a contract's meaning and legal effect are questions 
of law to be decided by a court where the contract is clear and unambiguous. This Court held in Jim 
& Maryann Plane Family Trust v. Skinner,_ Idaho_, 342 P.3d 639, 645-646 (2015): 
"When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the document's language." Potlatch 
Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d 1277, 1280 
(2010)." In the absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, 
ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the 
instrument." Id. (quoting C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001)). 
If an agreement or contract is ambiguous, the resolution of any ambiguity raises a question 
of fact for the trier of fact. St. Clair v. Krueger, 115 Idaho 702, 704, 769 P.2d 579, 581 (1989); 
Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cool, 139 Idaho 770, 772, 86 P.3d 484,486 (2004). 
The preliminary question of whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,201, 899 P.2d 
411, 414 (1995). When an instrument is ambiguous in nature, the intention of the parties as 
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reflected by all of the circumstances in existence at the time the agreement was created must be 
considered in construing the agreement. Cusic v. Givens, 70 Idaho 229,215 P.2d 297 (1950); Quinn 
v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 250, 270 P.2d 825, 829-30 (1954). 
An instrument which is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation is ambiguous. 
Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 858, 673 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1983). Before this Court can review 
the district court's interpretation of the JP A, it must first determine whether the above clause is 
ambiguous. In doing so, this Court asks whether the reservation is "reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretation." See C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 766, 25 P.3d 76, 79 (2001). A 
contract term is ambiguous when there are two different, reasonable interpretations of the language. 
Swansonv. Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 62,175 P.3d 748,751 (2007). 
The JP A does not define property tax fonds or tax revenues. There is no uniformly 
recognized legal meaning for these terms. See Ida-Therm, LLC v. Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, 154 
Idaho 6, 10, 293 P.3d 630, 634 (2012) (recognizing that no Idaho case defined the term "mineral" 
and there was no uniformly recognized legal meaning for the term.). 
The district court erred when it held the terms "tax revenue" and "property tax fonds" were 
unambiguous. The district court ignored that portion of the Black Law Dictionary definition which 
preceded the language quoted by the district court and defined a tax as "[a] charge, usually 
monetary, imposed by the government on persons, entities, transactions, or property to yield public 
revenue." Black's Law Dictionary (Bryan A. Gardner 9th ed., West 2009). Such a definition does 
not encompass interest and cost arising from late payment of delinquent taxes. Further, the trial 
court ignored that Idaho Code section 40-805 categorizes interest and cost separate from delinquent 
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taxes. The clause itself is silent regarding payment of interest and penalties on delinquent taxes. 
More than one reasonable interpretation of the JP A's tax fund or tax revenue payment 
clause exists. Two reasonable interpretations of the terms "tax revenue" and "property tax funds" 
have been advanced. One is that it was intended to include all funds connected to the levy of the ad 
valorem property taxes. The other is that it included only the ad valorem property tax revenue from 
the levy. R. p. 246. The district court erred in concluding that the clause was tmambiguous. 
The interpretation advanced by IHD that the clause included only the ad valorem tax 
revenue was reasonable. The Idaho Constitution defines taxation as revenue gained by levying a tax 
by valuation of owned property. Idaho Const. Article VII, section 2. The chapter and title of Idaho 
Code referenced in the JP A clause grants a highway district the power to levy ad valorem taxes. 
Idaho Code section 40-1309(3). Idaho Code section 40-801 reiterates this power, indicating that 
highway districts commissioners are empowered, for the purpose of construction and maintenance 
of highways and bridges under their jurisdiction, to make highway ad valorem tax levies. These tax 
levies are certified to the county auditor for tax collection and apportioned to the highway districts 
in the amount their levies produced exclusive of ordinary collection fees owed to the county. Idaho 
Code section 40-801 (2). These statutory provisions existed when the parties chose the language 
contained in the agreement and it was reasonable for IHD to interpret this clause to mean the 
payment of only the collected ad valorem taxes. 
Additionally, when property taxes are delinquent, late charges and interest are included. 
Idaho Code section 63-1002. Late charges are not defined as taxes. Idaho Code section 63-
201 (l 2). These code sections were also in existence at the time the agreement was prepared. 
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However, nothing in the agreement indicated the parties intended for the payment to the City to 
include late charges and interest, which were identified by Chapter 8, Title 40 as items separate 
from the ad valorem taxes, and which arose only in the event of a delinquent payment. 
The district court utilized the broadest definition of the term "tax" to support its analysis. 
More restrictive definitions exist that are equally reasonable to utilize in interpreting the term "tax". 
Merriam-Webster defines a tax as "an amount of money that a government requires people to pay 
according to their income, the value of their property, etc., and that is used to pay for the things done 
by the government. (Merriam-Webster Online, retrieved September 30, 2015 from 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tax.) The Idaho code definition of late charge is 
unrelated to imposition of a tax. Rather, it is imposed as a penalty for being delinquent in payment 
of the tax. The interest is also unrelated to imposition of the tax. Again, it is a charge incurred due 
to a delinquency. The late charge and interest do not arise from imposition of the tax levy. Thus, it 
is reasonable to interpret ''tax revenue" and "tax fund" to exclude such charges. 
By isolating its analysis to a few chosen words in the payment clause and ignoring the entire 
context of the agreement, the trial court concluded the clause was unambiguous. This analysis was 
incorrect. The district court was required to consider the clause in its entirety. The agreement 
mandated that IHD would levy and apply for ad valorem property taxes under the authority of 
Chapter 13, Title 40, Idaho Code. Following collection of the ad valorem taxes, the agreement 
required IHD to pay the City all property tax funds ''from such District levies." Thus, the tax funds 
referenced were those collected from IHD's levies. 
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Late charges and interest are not a result of IHD's levy. Rather, they are assessed later 
because of a delinquency in payment of the levy. A reasonable interpretation of this clause was 
IHD was to utilize its power to levy ad valorem taxes and pay to the City that portion of ad valorem 
taxes collected on real property located within the City. 
Sufficient evidence in the record at summary judgment precluded the grant of the summary 
judgment on this issue. The settlement agreement and stipulation to dismiss the previous lawsuit 
informed the trial court that IHD had agreed to tum over to the City the ad valorem taxes it collected 
on real property located within city limits. No mention was made that IHD had agreed to tum over 
late charges or interest paid to it on delinquent taxes. The second affidavit of Marj Tilley filed in 
opposition to the City's motion for summary judgment indicated throughout the history of payment 
to the City and performance of the agreement, IHD had never paid any penalties or interest collected 
on past due ad valorem taxes to the City. R. p. 236. The reasonable inference from this evidence 
was the parties did not intend for penalties and interest to be included, and conducted themselves 
accordingly. 
The City submitted no evidence that any past due penalty or interest were due in support of 
its summary judgment. It also submitted no evidence explaining why it allowed IHD to go over ten 
years without paying an amount it claimed was due under the contract. Despite this lack of 
evidence in the record, the trial court made up its own explanation of why IHD's past performance 
contradicted the payment term. The trial court held this Court's statute of limitations analysis in 
City of Rexburg v. Madison County, 115 Idaho 88, 89, 764 P.2d 8383, 389 (1988) stood for the 
proposition that failure to correctly distribute ad valorem taxes owed to a city was a factor to for it to 
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consider in drawing an inference in favor of the City despite the lack of evidence in the record 
before it. The trial court held "failure to distribute exact monies owed to a city by highway districts 
does not in itself imply an ambiguity because such distributions have previously been subject to 
simple human error and oversight." R. p. 281. The trial court then impermissibly drew an inference 
in favor of the City, relying upon this case, and held, "[i]f a city can go twenty-two years without 
noticing it is only being paid one-tenth of funds due, it is reasonable to infer that the City here 
may not have taken notice of the discrepancy in the decade following the formation of the 
contract. This does not create an ambiguity in the contract. It merely shows oversight by City in 
failing to realize IHD failed to perform in accordance with the Agreement." (Emphasis added.) R. 
p. 281. It was error for the trial court to draw this inference in favor of the City on this material 
issue of disputed fact based upon the facts of an unrelated case. 
Further, City of Rexburg, supra, provides no authority or guidance to this issue and the 
district court's reliance on this case was misplaced. City of Rexburg, supra, addressed an incorrect 
apportionment of highway fund levies by Madison County to the City of Rexburg. For nearly 
twenty-two years, only 5% of highway ad valorem taxes were apportioned and paid to the City of 
Rexburg instead of the 50% required by Idaho Code section 40-801 due to a clerical error. This 
Court ruled a three year statute oflimitation applied to reimbursement due to such a mistake. 
No interpretation of an agreement was involved in City of Rexburg. This case adds nothing 
to the analysis of whether the JP A payment clause is ambiguous, or how it should be interpreted. At 
most, it stands for the proposition that the City may only seek payment of any unpaid penalties and 
interest for three years prior to filing its suit if a finder of fact holds in its favor. It does not address 
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the issue of whether IHD' s non-payment of the penalty and interest was because "tax revenue" or 
"tax funds" was not intended to include the late charges and interest. It was error for the district 
court to infer that the failure to pay was due to clerical error based upon the City of Rexburg ruling. 
D. The trial court erred in awarding damages to the City for breach of contract 
Besides the above issue regarding the grant of summary judgment on the contract issue, 
the trial court erred in the relief awarded for breach of contract in its final judgment following its 
grant of summary judgment to the City. In its Final Judgment filed November 22, 2014, the trial 
court declared "[t]he Independent Highway District is directed to include in its payment of ad 
valorem taxes to the City of Sandpoint all taxes collected pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-800 
et seq., including without limitation any collection for past, present or future delinquent taxes, 
interest and costs, that are collected as a result of Independent Highway District levies on the 
taxpayers of the City of Sandpoint." R. p. 386. (Emphasis added.) The district court also 
decreed post judgment interest at the legal rate would accrue until the judgment was paid in full. 
Id. 
In its memorandum decision, the district court held, "[t]he language of the Agreement is 
clear. IHD should have been paying City all revenue from ad valorem taxes, including interest 
and penalties." R. p. 281. In other words, the trial court found IHD breached the contract by 
failing to pay penalty and interests. 
The City presented no evidence in the record of amount it claimed it was due in past 
interest and late charges. The trial court determined no amount due for interest and costs 
previously collected and not paid to the City by IHD. Despite the City's failure to support its 
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claim for damages for the breach of contract, the Court's final judgment ordered IHD to pay over 
unspecified amounts collected in the past and to pay interest on such amounts. R. p. 386. 
On December 8, 2014, IHD filed an amended motion to alter or amend the judgment on 
the grounds that the City had failed to prove any amount due for the above breach of contract. 
AR Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed December 8, 2014. IHD contended that the City 
had failed to present evidence in support of its breach of contract damages in its summary 
judgment. The district court denied the motion. R. p. 388-389. 
In Hull v. Giesler, 156 Idaho 765,331 P.3d 507,516 (2014), this Court held: 
Breach of contract requires "(a) the existence of the contract, (b) the breach of the 
contract, ( c) the breach caused damages, and ( d) the amount of those damages." 
Mosel! Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269, 278, 297 P.3d 232, 241 
(2013). The plaintiff has the burden to prove that he was iajured and his iajury 
was the result of the defendant's breach; "both amount and causation must be 
proven with reasonable certainty." Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Constr. & Trucking, 
Inc., 151 Idaho 761,770,264 P.3d 400,409 (2011). 
The district court determined the terms of the agreement of the parties and found IHD 
had breached the terms of the agreement by failing to include late charges and interest on 
delinquent taxes to the City. The district court ordered IHD pay unspecified amounts for these 
items to the City. 
The City presented no evidence in the summary judgment of any amounts it claimed it 
was owed for the alleged breach. It was error for the trial court to require IHD in its judgment to 
include past amounts in its payment to the City when there was no evidence of damages from the 
alleged breach. The trial court erred in making such an order. 
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E. The District Court's permanent injunction was improper in form 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65( d) addresses the form and scope of an injunction. This 
rule requires every order granting an injunction shall set forth the reasons for its issuance, shall 
be specific in terms, and shall describe in reasonable detail the act or acts sought to be restrained. 
The trial court's final judgment merely indicated "[a] permanent injunction shall issue with 
regard to the obligation." This permanent injunction does not comply in form or scope with 
I.R.C.P. 65(d). The trial court erred in the entry of a permanent injunction using such vague 
language. 
Further, because the JP A was void ab initio, it was improper for the trial court to issue an 
injunction mandating that IHD continue to make payments pursuant to a void agreement. 
F. The District Court's erred in its award of attorney fees 
The standard of review on appeal of an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 12-117 is set forth in City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906,908,277 P.3d 353,355 
(2012) and is determined based upon an abuse of discretion standard. In Taylor v. AJA Services 
Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 559, 261 P.3d 829, 836 (2011), this Court reiterated its prior holdings on 
abuse of discretion, holding: 
"The burden of showing the trial court abused its discretion rests with the 
appellant." Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451,456, 95 P.3d 69, 74 (2004). In reviewing a 
trial court's abuse of discretion, this Court considers: (1) whether the court correctly 
perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether the court acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) 
whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 
673,678, 152 P.3d 544, 549 (2007). 
In its memorandum decision filed July 31, 2014, the district court held: 
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There is no doubt in the Court's mind that City is in all aspects the prevailing 
party as compared to IHD. The Court so finds City to be the prevailing party in this 
litigation. 
Thus, if City requests fees under I.C. § 12-117(4), City is entitled to those fees 
as the prevailing party and the only issue at the time of a motion under I.R.C.P. 54( c )(5) 
will be the amount of those fees. 
R. p. 290. 
On appeal, IHD maintains that it was error for the trial court to award attorney fees based 
upon the erroneous holding regarding the constitutional argument. IHD also maintains it was 
error for the trial court to award attorney fees even if this court affirms the trial court's 
constitutional analysis. 
Since the trial court erred in holding that the City was entitled to damages for the breach 
of contract claim, it was error for the trial court to award the City attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code section 12-117(4) at the summary judgment level. 
On August 13, 2014, the City filed a Notice of Presentment without oral argument for its 
motion for award of attorney's fees and costs scheduled for Wednesday, August 27, 2014. R. pp. 
296-297. The City also filed its motion for an award of attorney fees and costs and supporting 
pleadings on August 13, 2014. R. pp. 298-334. Eight days later, on August 21, 2014, the trial 
court entered its Order Granting Request for Attorney Fees and Costs. R. pp. 335-337. On the 
same date, the trial court filed a proposed declaratory and monetary judgment presented by the 
City which again did not comply with Rule 54(a), I.R.C.P. R. pp. 338-341. This judgment 
awarded the City $56,131.75 in attorney's fees. Id 
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IHD thereafter on August 27, 2015, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the award of 
attorney's fees on the grounds that it was entered prior to the time I.R.C.P. 54(d)(7) allowed for 
settlement of costs by order of the court. R. pp. 350-352. IHD also filed its objection to the 
City's request for attorney fees and its motion to disallow the attorney fees, along with the 
supporting memorandum and affidavits in support of the motion. R. pp. 353-369. IHD filed an 
additional supporting affidavit on September 8, 2014. AR Affidavit of Marfice filed September 
8, 2014. 
Assuming arguendo for the sake of addressing this issue on appeal that the trial court was 
correct in the manner in which it awarded the breach of contract damages to the City, the amount 
of fees it awarded was not reasonable. This matter was decided on motion practice. No 
discovery was promulgated. No depositions were taken. No trial was held. 
Four major motions were involved: IHD's motion to dismiss, IHD's motion for 
permissive appeal, the City's motion for summary judgment and the City's motion for an award 
of attorney fees. The parties negotiated a reciprocal preliminary injunction. R. p. 179-181. The 
City also responded to IHD's motion to alter or amend the judgment and the award of attorney 
fees. 
Three factors regarding the amount of attorney fees require examination on appeal. The 
first is the time and labor required to produce City's work product. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A). The 
second is the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability 
of the attorney in the particular field of law. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(C). The third is the prevailing 
charge for like work. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(D). "Before a court may determine whether claimed 
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attorney fees are reasonable, it must have enough information to properly consider the factors of 
Rule 54(e)(3)." Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526,284 P.3d 970, 974 (2012). 
Turning to the time and labor factor, the City's private counsel billed 191.15 hours for 
attorney time; 20.5 hours for law clerk time and 4.4 hour for paralegal time for a total of 216.05 
hours devoted to motion practice. R. p. 30. This time did not include drafting of the complaint 
and summons, which was completed by the City Attorney before the City's private counsel 
appeared on 9/30/2013. R. p. 12. 
\\'hen this time is broken down by the significant pleadings, the City's outside counsel 
spent 51.1 hours doing legal research to respond to IHD's motion to dismiss. R. pp. 314-319 6 
On drafting the brief filed in opposition to the motion to dismiss, the City spent 48.2 hours 
drafting the opposition brief, although 1 hour of law clerk time was not charged. Id The City 
spent 12 hours preparing for and attending the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Id This time 
excludes office conference time, client conference time, and responses to IHD's motion to strike 
affidavits filed by the City related to the motion to dismiss. Id. The City filed a 25 page brief, 
excluding the certificate of service, based upon the time it invested in the response to the motion 
to dismiss. R. pp. 73-98. 
Another way of viewing this item is that it took the City 99.3 hours to research and create 
the 25 page brief filed in opposition to the motion to dismiss, not including the time to prepare 
for hearing and client conferences, and the response to IHD's motion to strike the affidavits 
submitted by the City as part of the response to the motion to dismiss. In total, the City devoted 
6 Appendix A includes an Excel sheet with a tabulation of the numbers referenced herein. 
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just under 4 hours average to each page of its brief. The constitutional argument presented a 
more complex argument given the breadth ofldaho law on the issue and required more labor and 
time to analyze. However, the remaining issues were not complex, and should not require an 
unusual amount of labor or time to analyze. Given the scope and depth of the memorandum 
submitted by the City in opposition to IHD's motion to dismiss, the amount of time and labor 
devoted to the response brief appears excessive. 
Although minor in scope, included in the City's billings was 1.5 hours to prepare a 
response to an auditor at the cost of $487.50. R. p. 327. Such response was unrelated to the 
litigation, but the district court awarded attorney fees for this unrelated item. 
Thereafter, the City opposed IHD's motion for permissive appeal. The City's counsel 
invested a fair portion of time prior to IHD's motion researching a Rule 54(b) certification of the 
court's denial ofIHD's motion to dismiss. R. pp. 323-325. In total, the City devoted 3.8 hours 
to researching the matter and 7 hours to writing and phone calls on the Rule 54(b) certification 
issue. 7 Id. Another 4.3 hours was expended in legal research to respond to IHD's motion to 
allow permissive appeal at the trial court level. R. p. 329. Another 7.3 hours was utilized to 
draft the response, prepare for and attend the hearing on the motion for permissive appeal at the 
district court level. Id. Thereafter, following the trial court's grant of the motion for permissive 
appeal, the City's counsel invested another 8.6 hours in legal research and 15.5 hours in legal 
drafting to file an opposition to IHD's motion for permissive appeal with this Court. R. pp. 330-
7 Appendix B contains an Excel spreadsheet summarizing of the time spent on both the 54(b) certification and the 
opposition to the Motion for pennissive Appeal at the trial court level and before this Court. 
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332. Given the opposition at the trial court level, the additional hours for legal research and 
writing to prepare the opposition memorandum to this Court appears excessive. 
The City filed for summary judgment. The City initially filed a 4 page memorandum in 
support of its motion. R. p. 199-193. The City expended 3.85 hours in preparing the initial 
motion. R. p. 332.8 The City accrued 4.8 hours in legal research time for its reply brief, and 
30.4 hours drafting its response brief, preparing for and attending the hearing, and preparing an 
order for the Court to enter following the hearing. The reply brief was ten pages, one of which 
was a certificate of service. R. pp. 261-271. The number of hours claimed as reasonable to draft 
the nine page reply argument appears excessive. 
Thereafter, the City expended 9.1 hours preparing its memorandum of costs in support of 
its fees, and preparation of a proposed order. R. p. 34. Again, this amount of time and labor 
devoted to a standard pleading appears excessive. 
The next factor for examination is the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly 
and the experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(C). 
The Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of C. Matthew Andersen in Support of Attorney's Fees 
and Costs indicate that his prevailing rate in $375.00 per hour, but he reduced his fee to $325.00 
because he was representing a public entity. R. p. 309. Mr. Anderson also indicated that 
Beverly Anderson was billed at $225.00 per hour. R. p. 309. (A slight portion of Ms. 
Anderson's time was billed at $250.00 per hour. R. p. 310.) Mr. Andersen opined the rates 
charged for legal services were prevailing and competitive in the area, and were reasonable and 
8 Appendix C contains an Excel spreadsheet summarizing the time spent on the summary judgment initial brief, 
reply brief, and totals of each. 
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customary hourly rates for this type of legal work. No support was provided for this opinion 
other than Mr. Andersen's conclusory statement. 
In their application for attorney fees, Mr. Andersen indicated that Ms. Anderson 
spearheads the firm's litigation research and working with litigation counsel, she conducts or 
supervises research and brief writing for all phases of major litigation. R. p. 306-307. Ms. 
Anderson is not licensed in Idaho. R. p. 307. Given the issues in this case, familiarity with 
Idaho's constitution and Idaho's statutes should enhance the understanding of the constitutional 
and statutory issues raised in this litigation. Given Ms. Anderson's lack of an Idaho license, it is 
probable that her research time was increased as reflected in the hours devoted to legal research 
which are before this Court. This factor dovetails with the previous factor of the reasonable 
labor and time devoted to the matter. The trial court erred in finding the hours were reasonable 
and necessary and the attorneys possessed the skill necessary to address the issues. Further, 
there is no prevailing rate in Idaho for an unlicensed attorney working on an Idaho case. 
Finally, the trial court erred in finding the amounts charged were the prevailing charge 
for like work. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(D). This Court held in Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 
435, 111 P.3d 110, 120 (2005) that the trial court "should consider the fee rates generally 
prevailing the pertinent geographic area, rather than what any particular segment of the legal 
community may be charging." The trial court erred in this case by failing to follow this holding. 
Other than opining that their rate was reasonable and in accordance with the prevailing 
rate, the City's counsel presented no evidence that such was the case. The City's counsel opined 
that the rate was prevailing in cases that require the level of law firm support, resources for trial 
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preparation, travel, expertise and skill for trial as were present in the case. R. p. 309. However, 
the City's counsel presented no evidence regarding the prevailing charges for like work in the 
applicable geographic area. 
On the other hand, IHD's attorneys presented evidence that Eric Stidham with Holland & 
Hart's Boise branch billed $285 an hour for complex litigation issues in this geographic area; 
that John Miller charged $200 per hour for a non-complex litigation trial matter in the 
geographic area; that IHD's counsel's billing rate for non-complex civil litigation was $225 an 
hour and complex litigation was billed at $250 an hour; that Joel Hazel with Witherspoon Kelly 
was charging $285 an hour at his highest rate; that Doug Marfice with Ramdsen Lyons (now 
Ramsden, Marfice, Ealey & Harris) was billing $250 an hour; that Brent Featherston was billing 
$250 an hour and Ausey ("Rusty") Robnett, who was then with Paine Hamblen, was billing $250 
an hour for non-recurring clients in the geographic area. R. pp. 353-357. Mr. Featherston and 
Mr. Marfice also submitted affidavits that corroborated this testimony. R. pp 367-369, AR 
Affidavit ofMarfice filed September 8, 2014. 
Rather than looking at the prevailing charge for like work in the geographic area, the trial 
court abused its discretion by focusing on the longevity of time practiced by the attorneys 
performing the City's legal work. The trial court disregarded testimony submitted on prevailing 
rates for like work in the geographic area, noting that Douglas S. Marfice, Brent Featherston and 
Susan Weeks all had less experience than Beverly Anderson by five years, and holding this 
justified an upward departure from the City's initial fee request of $225 an hour for Ms. 
Anderson. AR Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in Part (As to timing of this Court's 
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Prior Decision) and Denying in Part (As to Amount of Attorney Fees Previously Awarded) 
Defendant IHD's Motion for Reconsideration of Attorney Fees filed October 24 2014, page 5. 
The trial court ignored that Ms. Anderson was not an Idaho licensed attorney and there is no 
prevailing charge for an unlicensed attorney in Idaho. 
The Court also relied solely on the fact that Mr. Andersen was licensed in Washington for 
thirty-eight years at the time of the fee request as justification for the rate awarded. AR 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in Part (As to timing of this Court's Prior Decision) 
and Denying in Part (As to Amount of Attorney Fees Previously Awarded) Defendant IHD's 
Motion for Reconsideration of Attorney Fees filed October 24 2014, page (Mr. Andersen was 
licensed in Idaho for twenty eight years at the time of the fee request.) The court engaged in no 
analysis of the prevailing rate for like work in the geographic area in its award. In its motion to 
reconsider, IHD raised that the Court had recently adjusted another case downwards by 33%, 
finding the lead attorney, Robert A. Dunn's $400 per hour rate was not the prevailing charge for 
like work. AR Amended Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment filed December 8, 2015, page 6. 
In ruling on IHD's request for reconsideration of the attorney fee award, the trial court 
claimed it did not award the requested attorney fees in the case raised by IHD on the motion to 
reconsider because Spokane attorney Robert A Dunn, who billed $400.00 per hour, was only 
licensed for seven years and "[ e ]xperience is perhaps the largest factor in any attorney 
determining his hourly rate, a rate which the market will decide can be justified in any particular 
case, the client ratifies is justified." AR Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in Part (As 
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to timing of this Court's Prior Decision) and Denying in Part (As to Amount of Attorney Fees 
Previously Awarded) Defendant IHD's Motion for Reconsideration of Attorney Fees filed 
October 24 2014, pp. 6-7. 
The flaw in this analysis is that the trial court's analysis of Mr. Dunn's attorney fees was 
not based upon his being a 7 year licensed attorney. It was one of the other attorneys involved 
who was licensed for 7 years. Robert A. Dunn was a Washington licensed attorney since 1981. 
The other flaw in the trial court's analysis is Ausey Robnett has been licensed since October 22, 
1984, thirty years at the time of the trial court's decision. The trial court ignored this fact in its 
analysis of Ms. Anderson's rate, and in the analysis of Mr. Andersen's rate and did not address 
Mr. Robnett's rate, or any of the other attorney rates charged in the geographical area. 
Instead of analyzing and weighing the prevailing rate for like work in the geographic 
area, the trial court indicated it found the factor contained in "I.R.C.P. 54(3)(3((G)" [sic] a 
powerful reason why the amount awarded was reasonable. AR Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting in Part (As to timing of this Court's Prior Decision) and Denying in Part (As to 
Amount of Attorney Fees Previously Awarded) Defendant IHD's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Attorney Fees filed October 24 2014, page 8. The trial court indicated that the suit involved 
multi-decade litigation in more current-time with this lawsuit arising from IHD's blunt statement 
given with little notice it would not be paying the City the substantial contract price of about 
$350,000.00 per year on a contract that was reached to put prior decades of litigation to bed. AR 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in Part (As to timing of this Court's Prior Decision) 
and Denying in Part (As to Amount of Attorney Fees Previously Awarded) Defendant IHD's 
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Motion for Reconsideration of Attorney Fees filed October 24 2014, page 8. In other words, the 
trial court found that a punitive measure justified the award. 
Regarding the amount involved and the results obtained, no evidence was ever admitted 
m the record regarding the amount involved. The City stated, without support, in its 
memorandum of costs that the amount exceeded $300,000. R. p. 311. It also said that IHD 
sought recoupment of the entire amount paid plus interest, which was rejected and summary 
judgment granted in favor of the City. Id. At no time did IHD raise recoupment as an 
affirmative defense. IHD raised other defenses in its motion to dismiss, but recoupment was not 
one of them. While summary judgment was granted to the City, no such defense was ever 
advanced in the litigation by IHD. 
The trial court awarded attorney fees in the full amount requested by the City before Rule 
54 allowed and before IHD had a fair opportunity to object. R. pp. 335-337. Following IHD's 
Motion to Reconsider this decision and request the trial court properly hear and consider its 
objection, the district court again awarded the same attorney fee award. AR Memorandum 
Decision and Order Granting in Part (As to timing of this Court's Prior Decision) and Denying in 
Part (As to Amount of Attorney Fees Previously Awarded) Defendant IHD's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Attorney Fees filed October 24 2014. The trial court was specific that it was 
giving the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(G) factor the most weight in its award of attorney fees. Id at page 8. 
"Although one of the twelve factors listed is '[t]he amount involved and the results 
obtained,' I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(G), this factor is given no more weight than any others." Lunders v. 
Estate of Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 700, 963 P .2d 3 72, 383 (1998). The trial court abused its 
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discretion in considering this factor to the exclusion of the prevailing rate, and other factors listed 
in 54( e )(3). It is clear from its holding the trial court utilized this factor as a punitive measure 
against IHD for raising the constitutional issue. Rule 54 does not utilize a punitive component as 
one of the factors the trial court is to consider in awarding fees. 
As previously briefed, Idaho Code section 12-117(4) mandates an award in any civil 
proceeding involving as adverse parties a governmental entity and another governmental entity. 
IHD requests its reasonable attorney fees pursuant to this statute on appeal should it prevail. 
G. A New Trial Judge should be assigned on Remand 
This Court on two occasions has assigned a new judge on remand, both cases which 
originated in the First Judicial District. Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 
411, 424, 283 P.3d 728, 741 (2012); Sky Canyon Properties, LLC v. The Golf Club at Black 
Rock, LLC, _ P.3d _, 2015 WL 5719996 (September 30, 2015). In Capstar, this Court 
found a new presiding judge would provide a much needed fresh perspective and to eliminate 
any concerns relating to the repeated assertions of judicial bias. In Sky Canyon, this Court 
replaced the district court on remand following a position by the trial court that was 
characterized as ridiculous. 
In this matter, the district judge took several opportunities to express his displeasure with 
IHD's position, even relying upon facts that weren't in the record, pre-determining issues before 
they were ripe, introducing arguments not presented by the City, and preventing IHD from being 
heard on its presentment of judgment by entering another judgment (not proper in form). 
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The first such incident arose when the trial court noted, "[ o ]f concern to the Court is the 
fact that the parties have obviously considered this to be a binding agreement for the past ten 
years. Apparently, IHD recently received legal advice indicating there are legal arguments to be 
made as to the legitimacy of the agreement. Obviously, the City relied on these revenues being 
paid from IHD to the City each year. Rather than IHD bringing a declaratory action against the 
City where IHD would continue to pay the City under the contract until those legal arguments 
are decided by a court, IHD instead chose to simply not pay the under the agreement, leaving the 
City in the lurch financially and forcing the City to sue IHD." R. p. 159. This analysis played no 
legal role in the determination ofIHD's motion to dismiss. 
The trial court also advanced arguments and drew inferences not raised by the City in its 
motion for summary judgment memorandum or its reply. The trial court, utilizing Sandpoint 
Independent Highway Distr. v. Board of County Com 'rs of Bonner County, 138 Idaho 887, 892, 
71 P.3d 1034, 1039 (2003) relied upon testimony mentioned by the Idaho Supreme Court in the 
former case to draw the inference in the present case that city residents would naturally look to 
city officials for guidance as to whether it was in their interest to support dissolution of the 
highway district. R. p. 283. IHD had no opportunity to rebut this inference from this testimony 
as it wasn't raised by the City. This Court has expressed that trial courts should not sua sponte 
raise issues not argued by the opposing party. See generally Deon v. H&J, Inc., Idaho_, 
339 P.3d 500,553-554 (2014). By interjecting additional facts not argued by the City in support 
of its decision, the trial court acted as an advocate for the City and did not give IHD a fair 
opportunity to dispute the facts relied upon by the trial court. 
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In this matter, the City's complaint requested attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 12-121. R. p. 29. In its summary judgment, the City again requested attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121. R. pp. 187-189. In its memorandum decision on 
summary judgment, the trial court declined to address the Idaho Code section 12-121 request, 
indicating it was not the most applicable statute. R. p. 289. At the hearing on summary 
judgment, the trial comi inquired of the City why it was not pursuing fees under Idaho Code 
section 12-117(4). R. p. 289. Despite the City's explanation of its reasons, the trial court 
directed its analysis to Idaho Code section 12-117 ( 4) even though the City had not requested fees 
under this statute. R. p. 289. In following this course of action, the district court once again 
interceded on behalf of the City as an advocate rather than basing its decision upon the 
arguments presented. 
On July 31, 2014, the Court entered an Order Granting Declaratory Relief submitted by 
the City's counsel which purportedly contained a Rule 54(b) certificate even though the order did 
not comply with Rule 54(a), I.R.C.P. R. pp. 292-294. This order awarded the City its attorney 
fees and the Court added the language "only after I.R.C.P. 54 application." IHD did not join in 
presentment of the proposed judgment. Id 
Thereafter, on August 13, 2014, the City filed its memorandum of costs and attorney fees. 
R. pp. 298-334. Eight days later, on August 21, 2014, without compliance with I.R.C.P. 
54( d)(7), the trial court entered its Order Granting Request for Attorney Fees and Costs. R. pp. 
335-337. On the same date, the trial court filed a proposed declaratory and monetary judgment 
presented by the City which again did not comply with Rule 54(a), I.R.C.P. R. pp. 338-341. 
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This judgment awarded the City $56,131.75 in attorney's fees. Id On August 22, 2014, the trial 
court entered an amended order granting the City's request for attorney fees and costs. R. pp. 
342-344. The trial court also entered an amended declaratory and monetary judgment on the 
same date, including attorney fees. R. pp. 345-349. On October 28, 2014, IHD scheduled a 
notice of hearing to present a form of final judgment on November 19, 2014. AR Notice of 
Hearing Re: Defendant's Motion for Presentment of Judgment filed October 28, 2014. 
Immediately prior to the hearing, on November 13, 2014, the trial court entered a second 
amended declaratory and monetary judgment which was not approved as to form by IHD, and 
mooted IHD's motion. R. pp. 384. This order still did not comply with the final judgment rule. 
Finally, on November 22, 2014, the trial court entered a final judgment which indicated it was 
done in open court. R. pp. 385-387. However, no hearing was held on that date. R. p. 17. 
The trial court's actions indicate it has acted with bias in favor of the City, motivated by 
its displeasure with the course of action taken by IHD. While it is appropriate for the trial court 
to point out what it deems to be the error ofIHD's ways, it is not appropriate for the trial court to 
become the City's advocate. Whether it perceives its transgressions or not, the trial court has 
made arguments and garnered evidence not advanced by the City to grant the City its summary 
judgment. It has informed the City when it wasn't advancing the best argument for an award of 
attorney fees. It has disregarded the attorney fee request advanced by the City and analyzed it 
under alternative grounds that it deemed were more beneficial to the City. It disregarded hearing 
dates and entered multiple judgments presented to the trial court without approval as to form by 
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IHD (and which were incorrect as to form). It disregarded I.R.C.P. 54(d)(7) in its rush to award 
the City attorney fees. 
Based upon these instances of the trial court acting as an advocate for the City's position 
as opposed to a finder of law and fact, IHD respectfully submits that the criteria of Capstar has 
been met. The trial court's actions, umelated to its decisions on the substantive issues oflaw and 
fact, indicate a bias for the City. Since this matter has not gone to trial, IHD requests a new 
presiding judge be assigned on remand. 
V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Should IHD be the prevailing party on this appeal, it is entitled to attorney fees on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-117(4), which provides: 
In any civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a governmental entity 
and another governmental entity, the court shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses. For 
purposes of this subsection, "governmental entity" means any state agency or 
political subdivision. 
IHD, as a governmental entity, is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees against 
the City, as another governmental entity, should it prevail on this appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
IHD requests that the trial court's decisions on the motion to dismiss and the motion for 
summary judgment be reversed and the case be remanded to the district court for further action 
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consistent with this Court's opinion. 
DATED this 1-' 1\, day ofNovember, 2015. 
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Appendix A 
MOTION TO DISMISS TIME AND BILLING 
Date Attorney Category of work Drafting Legal Research Amount/Drafting Amount/Research 
9/27/2013 CMA Pleading drafting 1 $ 325.00 
9/27/2013 BLA Research 1.2 $ 270.00 
9/30/2013 BLA Research 1.9 $ 427.50 
10/4/2013 BLA Research 2.2 $ 495.00 
10/7/2013 BLA Research 2.2 $ 495.00 
10/8/2013 BLA Research 1.4 $ 315.00 
10/9/2013 BLA Research 2.6 $ 585.00 
10/11/2013 TRW Research 3.1 $ 24.50 
10/14/2013 BLA Research 2.3 $ 517.50 
10/16/2013 TRW Research 3.5 $ 332.50 
10/16/2013 BLA Research 2.3 $ 517.50 
10/16/2013 TRW Pleading drafting 3.2 $ 304.00 
10/17/2013 BLA Research 3.8 $ 855.00 
10/18/2013 CMA Pleading drafting 1 $ 325.00 
10/23/2013 TRW Pleading drafting 0.4 $ 38.00 
10/23/2013 CMA Pleading drafting 2 $ 650.00 
10/25/2013 TRW Pleading drafting 2 $ 190.00 
10/28/2013 TRW Pleading drafting 0.3 $ 
10/28/2013 BLA Research 1.5 $ 337.50 
10/30/2013 CMA Pleading drafting 5 $ 1,625.00 
10/31/2013 CMA Pleading drafting 4 $ 1,300.00 
10/31/2013 BLA Research 3.3 $ 742.50 
11/1/2013 TRW Pleading drafting 0.8 $ 
11/1/2013 BLA Research 4.8 $ 1,080.00 
11/4/2013 TRW Pleading drafting 1.4 $ 133.00 
11/4/2013 BLA Research 2.9 $ 652.50 
11/5/2013 TRW Pleading drafting 3.4 $ 323.00 
11/5/2013 BLA Pleading drafting 2.2 $ 495.00 
11/5/2013 CMA Pleading drafting 6 $ 1,950.00 
11/6/2013 TRW Pleading drafting 3.5 $ 332.50 
11/6/2013 CMA Pleading drafting 10 $ 3,250.00 
11/7/2013 CMA Pleading drafting 5 $ 1,625.00 
11/7/2013 BLA Pleading drafting 3 $ 675.00 
11/8/2013 TRW Research 1 $ 
11/12/2013 BLA Research 1.1 $ 247.50 
11/13/2013 TRW Research 1 $ 
11/13/2013 CMA Pleading drafting 3 $ 975.00 
Total 48.2 51.1 $ 11,590.50 $ 10,819.50 
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APPENDIX B 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION RESEARCH AND OPPOSITION TO PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
Date Attorney Category of work Drafting Research Amount/Drafting Amount/Research 
54(b) 
1/22/2014 BLA Legal Research 0.8 $ 180.00 
1/24/2014 CMA Pleading Drafting 1 $ 325.00 
2/5/2014 CMA Pleading Drafting 1.5 $ 487.50 
2/20/2014 CMA Pleading Drafting 2 $ 650.00 
2/20/2014 BLA Legal Research 0.4 $ 90.00 
2/21/2014 CMA Pleading Drafting 1 $ 
2/21/2014 BLA Legal Research 1.6 $ 360.00 
2/23/2014 BLA Legal Research 1 
2/25/2014 CMA Pleading Drafting 1.5 $ 487.50 
Total for 54(b) 7 3.8 $ 1,950.00 $ 630.00 
Trial Court Permissive Appeal 
5/7/2014 CMA Review IHD Pleading 1 $ 325.00 
5/13/2014 CMA Pleading Drafting 1.5 $ 487.50 
5/13/2014 BLA Legal Research 2.8 $ 630.00 
5/14/2014 BLA Legal Research 1.1 $ 247.50 
5/14/2014 CMA Pleading Drafting 1.5 $ 487.50 
5/19/2014 BLA Legal Research 0.4 $ 90.00 
5/19/2014 CMA Review Pleading 0.8 $ 260.00 
5/21/2014 CMA Prepare/Attend Hearing 2.5 $ 812.50 
Total Trial Court Permissive Appeal 7.3 4.3 $ 2,372.50 $ 967.50 
Supreme Court Permissive Appeal 
6/24/2014 CMA Pleading Review 0.9 $ 202.50 
6/25/2014 BLA Legal Research 3.3 $ 742.50 
6/25/2014 CMA Pleading Drafting 2 $ 650.00 
6/26/2014 CMA Pleading Drafting 1.5 $ 
6/26/214 BLA Pleading Drafting 1.4 $ 315.00 
6/30/2014 BLA Pleading Drafting 4.4 $ 990.00 
7/1/2014 BLA Pleading Drafting 3 $ 675.00 
7/2/2014 BLA Pleading Drafting 1.1 $ 247.50 
Total Supreme Court Permissive Appeal 15.5 8.6 $ 4,947.50 $ 1,935.00 
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APPENDIX C 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PLEADINGS 
Date Attorney Category of work Drafting Legal Research Amount/Pleadin1 
SJ Opening Memorandum 
5/30/2014 BLA Draft SJ Pleading 1.4 $ 315.00 
6/3/2014 CMA Finalize SJ pleading 1.45 $ 471.25 
6/20/2014 CMA Edit SJ Pleading 1 $ 325.00 
Sub Total 3.85 $ 1,111.25 
SJ Reply Brief 
7/9/2014 BLA Review SJ Response 0.9 $ 202.50 
7/10/2014 CMA Work on SJ Reply 1 $ 325.00 
7/10/2014 BLA Work on SJ Reply 4.2 $ 945.00 
7/11/2014 BLA Work on SJ Reply 4 $ 900.00 
7/11/2014 CMA Work on SJ Reply 1.5 $ 487.50 
7/14/2015 BLA Legal Research 4.8 $ 1,080.00 
7/14/2014 CMA Draft SJ Pleading 2 $ 650.00 
7/15/2014 BLA Work on SJ Reply 1.1 $ 247.50 
7/21/2014 CMA Prepare for hearing 4 $ 1,300.00 
7/22/2014 CMA Attend Hearing & 4 $ 1,300.00 
Prepare order 
Sub-total 30.4 4.8 $ 7,437.50 
Total for Drafting and Research 34.25 4.8 $ 8,548.75 
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